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THE RULE OF LAW: ITS HISTORY AND
MEANING IN COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW,
AND LATIN AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
Nadia E. Nedzel, LL.M.
Abstract: This article compares and contrasts the concept of
the rule of law as it developed in common law and civilian legal sys-
tems, including discussion of the underlying cultural differences.  It
also examines how and why Latin American legal systems developed
problems, and the failure of the three waves of reform efforts that at-
tempted to ameliorate those problems.  By comparing unsuccessful in-
dependent judiciary reform efforts in Venezuela to successful efforts in
Chile, it posits that significant change can only come about when it is
brought by consensus, when changes are implemented on a whole sys-
tem in a careful, thoughtful manner, and when the change being
brought includes a rule of law (as opposed to rule through law) compo-
nent:  in other words, it proves checks and balances to keep govern-
mental power and politicization in check.  The advantage in common
law countries is based on procedural, structural, political, and cultural
characteristics, rather than on any substantive differences in the law.
Consequently, developing countries are best served by developing
their own solutions to problems, such as an inefficient judicial system,
rather than relying primarily on advice (and funding) from outside
entities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Rule of law” is an expression both praised and ridiculed
by adherents of opposite political philosophies, and it is a
principle claimed as the lodestar for widely differing le-
gal theories.  As much as an ideality as an ideal, the
words “rule of law” have served a wide range of purposes,
stretching from political sloganeering to the protection of
individual rights from the power of government.1
F.A. Hayek defined the phrase the rule of law to mean that
“government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances
and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”2
Generally, the assumption is that the rule of law safeguards freedom
and encourages individuals’ economic activity.3  Global organizations
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have
1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVEN-
TEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 3 (2004) (citations omitted).
2 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS 112 (Bruce Caldwell
ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1944).
3 See id. at 112-14.
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adopted and used an incomplete version of Hayek’s definition.4  Sadly,
though the term the Rule of Law is currently used with great fre-
quency, it is rarely used with any precision.  All too often, it is reduced
to a politicized mantra used to criticize developing countries.5  Stating
4 See, e.g., Maria Gonzalez de Asis, Anticorruption Reform, in RULE OF LAW PRO-
GRAMS 2.  (“Nevertheless, the term ‘rule of law’ is used in a very ambiguous way
leading to multiple understandings of the concept.  It comprises several character-
istics related to the fairness of both legal processes and judicial systems; the no-
tion that law equally binds all actors, starting with the government; and the idea
that courts can fairly and efficiently solve disputes among private parties and be-
tween them and the government.”), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/
docs/library/35977/asis_ac_rol.pdf (citations omitted). But see HAYEK, supra  note
2, at 112-23.  To the extent that the international law community regards Hayek
as endorsing only the Rechtsstaat view, they are ignoring his explicit contention
that economic planning and any instrumental use of the law is incompatible with
the rule of law. Id. at 113.
5 See, e.g., Policy Toward Latin America, Hearing before the Subcomm. on the
Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (state-
ment of Eric Farnsworth, Vice President, Council of the Americas) (2009), availa-
ble at 2009 WLNR 2140219 (“Even before the economic crisis hit, roughly a third
of the region’s population was living in poverty.  Some governments, like those in
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, were making solid progress reducing poverty
and building a stable middle class.  [I]nfrastructure, and the rule of law must also
be addressed.”); Robert J. Caldwell, Op. Ed., A War We Cannot Afford to Lose, S.D.
UNION-TRIB., May 25, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10116245  (“Mexican Presi-
dent Felipe Caldero´n has made the fight against the drug cartels and organized
crime his top national priority, as well he should.  Losing to the narco-traffickers’
violent syndicates would risk making Mexico a failed state, with disastrous conse-
quences for Mexico’s economic development and political reforms.  Simply put,
Mexico’s modernization cannot succeed without the rule of law against which the
cartels wage unrelenting war.”); Press Release, U.S. Embassy, MCC Reiterates
U.S. Commitment to Fight Poverty (Dec. 12, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR
24814367 (“The Millennium Challenge Corporation Board of Directors selected Co-
lombia, Indonesia, and Zambia as new countries eligible for large-scale grand
funding . . . These indicators measure countries’ demonstrated commitment to pol-
icies that promote, among other things, political and economic freedom, invest-
ments in education and health care, control of corruption, and respect for civil
liberties and the rule of law.”); Press Release, State Department, Western Hemi-
sphere and Caribbean:  Nicaragua’s Electoral Climate, (Oct. 29, 2008), available at
2008 WLNR 20627952 (“We have noted recent developments in Nicaragua that
call into question the credibility of the municipal elections. . . . These develop-
ments include the decertification of two opposition parties and interference with
non-governmental organizations that are working to promote respect for human
rights, rule of law, and economic development in Nicaragua.”); Press Release, Of-
fice of the White House Press Secretary, White House Press Secretary Dana Per-
ino Holds White House News Briefing Aboard Air Force One En Route to Peru
(Nov. 21, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 22283645 (“We also expect there to be a
pretty thorough discussion concerning corruption, and the importance of combat-
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that a country needs to strengthen the rule of law typically means that
it is subject to corruption, human rights violations, and generalized
lawlessness.6  Moreover, even authoritarian governments that often do
not abide by their own laws claim to support the rule of law, including
former President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Presidents Jiang Zemin
and Hu Jintao of China, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Indo-
nesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, Afghan warlord Abdul Rashid
Dostum,7 and former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami.8
Lest one think that Hayek’s association of the rule of law, effec-
tive governance, and economic development is a mere theory without
practical application, a comparison of the Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom of the World map9 with Transparency International’s 2010
Corruption Index,10 shows that the same countries dominate the top of
both lists.  The countries that appear on both lists can generally be
described as being in one or more of three categories:  either they have
a common law heritage, or they are in northern Europe, or they are
markedly ‘westernized’:  Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Finland,
Canada, The Netherlands, Australia, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Ire-
land, Austria, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Chile, the
United States, Estonia, Slovakia, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emir-
ates.  Scholars have previously noted the prevalence of common law
countries among this number and hypothesized about what “English-
ness” or a common law regime might have to do with incorporation of
both the rule of law and economic stability.11  According to conven-
tional wisdom among experts in law and finance: “law fosters economic
activity by protecting property rights.  A legal system that clearly allo-
cates and protects property rights from incursions by the state and
other actors (a ‘rule of law’) precedes economic development and is a
precondition to economic success.”12
ing corruption.  Corruption represents a very significant threat to economic devel-
opment; corruption has a corrosive effect on public trust, on government, and on
the rule of law.”).
6 See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Re-
lating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2000).
7 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 2 (2004).
8 Hossein Derakhshan, Democracy’s Double Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006,
at A2.
9 JAMES GWARTNEY, JOSHUA HALL & ROBERT LAWSON, THE FRASER INSTITUTE,
ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT (2010), http://www.
freetheworld.com/2010/reports/world/EFW2010_BOOK.pdf.
10 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, (2010),
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010.
11 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking  Law’s Relationship to the
Economy – Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 831, 834 (2009)
12 Id.
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The conclusion emerging from a substantial body of re-
lated research in law and finance is that common law
systems systematically provide higher quality protec-
tions than civil law—particularly French civil law—sys-
tems, resulting in more dispersed share ownership and
larger stock markets in the common law origin countries.
Extending the implications of this research in the early
2000s, at least one scholar found evidence that in recent
history, countries with common law systems have exper-
ienced faster economic growth than those belonging to
the civil law family.13
Recent analysis suggests that, rather than fostering economic
and governance development by trying to graft elements of the United
States legal system onto other countries, such efforts must be tailored
to the specific country at issue: “[I]f solutions must be found in specific-
country contexts, rather than applied from blueprints, those who ad-
vise or finance developing countries will need more humility in their
approaches, implying more . . . empathy with the country’s perspec-
tives, and more inquisitiveness in assessing the costs and benefits of
different possible solutions.”14  The only Latin American country that
is highly regarded by both the Economic Freedom Index and Trans-
parency International is Chile, which has undergone  tremendous
changes in the past thirty years.  The explanation for why this is the
case is the focus of this study.
This article argues first that the globalized definition of the
rule of law – i.e. the quasi-Hayekian Rechtsstaat (German) or e´tat de
droit (French) definition is only partial.  This definition fails to empha-
size a substantial and significant component of the traditional common
law concept: that the rule of law means that governmental powers are
circumscribed and limited by both the law itself and by structural and
procedural components that work to deter politicization and corrup-
tion.  Furthermore, it is these structural and procedural components
that help protect individual liberty and promote economic develop-
ment.  Next, the article argues that the advantage seen in common law
countries is based on procedural, structural, political, and cultural
characteristics, rather than on any substantive differences in the law.
Consequently, developing countries are best served by developing
their own solutions to problems such as an inefficient judicial system
rather than relying primarily on advice (and money) given or loaned
13 Id. at 832.
14 Id. at 844 (quoting THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LES-
SONS FROM A DECADE OF REFORM 26 (2006)).
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by outside entities.15  The article then provides an example of this idea
by comparing the successful reforms to Chile’s criminal justice system
to the lack of success of similar efforts in Venezuela.  Finally, the arti-
cle concludes that the rule of law, with its emphasis on limited govern-
ment and checks and balances, rather than Rechtsstaat, is key to
implementing widespread, successful legal changes, and that these
kinds of legal changes must be supported by cultural changes.
2. THE RULE OF LAW VERSUS THE RULE THROUGH LAW
A. Anglo-American Rule of Law
Reduced to a bare minimum, the traditional Anglo-American
concept of the rule of law is more properly defined as consisting of two
interdependent components:  1) a citizen’s obligation to obey the law
(the law and order component), and 2) the government’s subservience
to the law (the limited government component).16 The law-and-order
component, often encompassed in the “globalized” definition and re-
ferred to by authoritarian regimes, is that a government’s primary
function is to maintain order.17  The second component is indirectly
referenced when global entities such as the World Bank tie the ab-
sence of (governmental) corruption to the rule of law.18  However, the
second component of the Anglo-American concept is much more than
merely the absence of governmental corruption and the principle that
laws are to be applied equally to all.  It refers to the concept that it is
the law itself that is the ultimate sovereign, not any governmental en-
tity – a “government of laws, and not of men.”19
Sometimes there are simply no equivalent translations from
one language to another or from one legal system to another.  The An-
glo-American rule of law must be distinguished from the German con-
ception of Rechtsstadt and the French e´tat de droit, which properly
translated is the equivalent of “rule through law.”20  The rule of law
puts law as sovereign, above any government.  The rule through law
does not, and in fact allows an incorporation of the understanding of a
15 See Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Pro-
gram?, in CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 65, 65-77
(Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000) (arguing that Africa is
still based on an irrational, authoritarian society and must peacefully revolution-
ize its culture with regard to education, politics, economics, and social life in order
to move into modernism).
16 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1335-36 (2001).
17 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
18 Asis, supra note 4, at 4.
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
20 See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 1329.
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government as an enterprise association (i.e. an instrumentalist view)
aimed at directing society towards some specific goal, rather than a
non-instrumentalist, civil association aimed at minimizing interfer-
ence with individual liberty.21
Oxford legal scholar A.V. Dicey made the concept of the rule of
law part of British jurisprudence, asserting in 1915:
The rule of law . . . remains to this day a distinctive char-
acteristic of the English constitution.  In England no
man can be made to suffer punishment or to pay dam-
ages for any conduct not definitely forbidden by law;
every man’s legal rights or liabilities are almost invaria-
bly determined by the ordinary Courts of the realm, and
each man’s individual rights are far less the result of our
constitution than the basis on which that constitution is
founded.22
In the twentieth century, British political philosopher Michael
Oakeshott took this definition and, through his explanation of a dis-
tinction between civil and enterprise associations, and (using civil ver-
sus enterprise association distinction) posited that the rule of law
implies non-instrumentality: a government’s proper role is that of a
civil association of its citizenry, without any particular goal of promot-
ing any individual, group, or program above any other.23  In contrast,
an enterprise association, such as a business, by definition has a goal –
producing a product and earning a profit.  During times of war, a gov-
ernment may act as an enterprise association because its goal is to
protect itself, but otherwise a government should act neutrally rather
than instrumentally.  Under the traditional common law understand-
ing of the rule of law, in order to preserve this neutrality, government
is a necessary evil, and governmental powers must constantly and con-
sistently be checked and circumscribed.24
Thus, as most recently expressed by Brian Tamanaha, the com-
monly-accepted instrumentalist view of law as a means to an end is
21 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 119 (Oxford University Press
1975).
22 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION lv (Liberty Classics 1982) (1915).
23 See OAKESHOTT, supra note 21, at 118-19, 149 (“The recognition of respublica
which constitutes civil association is neither approval of the conditions it
prescribes nor expectations about the enforcement of these conditions; it is recog-
nizing it as a system of law.”) See generally id. at 108-184 (explaining this idea in
more detail).
24 Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 1336-37.
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inconsistent with the rule of law.25  The non-instrumentalist concep-
tion of the law as ruler is necessary to avoid system-wide politicization
so that a judge “believes it is possible to be bound by law and sees it as
a solemn obligation to render legally bound and determined deci-
sions.”26  Sadly, as Dicey foresaw, the concept of the law as supreme
has been continually eroded among common law jurisdictions since the
latter part of the nineteenth century, and he too saw this as a danger-
ous trend towards politicization of the courts:
The ancient veneration for the rule of law has in England
suffered during the last thirty years a marked decline.
The truth of this assertion is proved by actual legisla-
tion, by the existence among some classes of a certain
distrust both of the law and of the judges, and by a
marked tendency towards the use of lawless methods for
the attainment of social or political ends.27
This statement demonstrates Dicey’s recognition that the “le-
gal positivist” movement developed by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin,
and others was instrumentalist in nature and inconsistent with the
rule of law.28  The most extreme version of this detour away from the
rule of law is undoubtedly the Critical Legal Studies movement, which
regards law as a mere formalization of politics and class struggle.29
This view has become so widely accepted that one legal scholar has
even argued that the rule of law has completely disappeared in Ameri-
can jurisprudence.30
B. European Rule Through Law
The European conception developed out of the French Revolu-
tion’s rejection of the pre-revolutionary rigid social structure and tur-
gid legal system, its adoption of the language of rights (liberte´, egalite´,
fraternite´), and its focus on the development of an organized, logically-
25 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 504 (2007).
26 Id. See also TAMANAHA, supra note 7.
27 DICEY, supra note 22, at lv.
28 See TAMANAHA, supra note 7, at 57 (discussing legal positivism).
29 See e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE
L.J. 1515 (1991); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983) (arguing that political interests shape the law).
For a succinct description of the CLS movement, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 106-127 (1996).
30 John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 199 (1995).
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coherent and transparent system of laws (the civil code).31  In post-
Revolutionary France, the E´tat le´gal (Legal State)  embodied the dem-
ocratic will (volonte´ ge´ne´rale) of the nation32— as that will was ex-
pressed by legislation.  This conception left no room for government
action outside enacted law and compares to the legal positivism of the
German Rechtsstaat.33  The Rechsstaat, however, was more complex
and regarded government both “as the representative of the general
will (restricting the administration to application of the enacted law)
and as having its own particular will (based on the government’s sub-
jective right to command).”34  It was in this way that the original con-
cept of Rechsstaat was a way of establishing the legitimacy of
government through adherence to legislation.35  Towards the end of
the nineteenth century, the Rechtsstaat concept changed, and “re-
quire[ed] substantive legitimacy such as, for instance, the protection of
human rights.”36  However, that view still did not incorporate the view
that government is subservient to law,37 and when rigidly followed al-
lowed the establishment of the Third Reich.  At the same time that the
Rechtsstaat was de-liberalized in Germany, positivism was in the as-
cendancy in both Germany and Great Britain.
The closest current French equivalent, e´tat de droit (or state of
law), is consistent with the later Rechtsstaat in that it is defined as “a.
the situation that results, for a society, from its submission to a juridi-
cal order that excludes anarchy and private justice, or b. in a more
exact sense, the phrase refers to the respect for rights guaranteed to
those subjected to a state’s laws that they will not be treated arbitrar-
ily.”38  The first definition restates the law-and-order component.  The
31 EDUARDO GARCI´A DE ENTERRI´A, LA LENGUA DE LOS DERECHOS: LA FORMACIO´N
DEL DERECHO PU´BLICO EUROPEO TRAS LA REVOLUCIO´N FRANCESA 26-42, 151-152
(Alianza Universidad 2d ed. 1995)
32 Mireille Hildebrandt, Justice and Police: Regulatory Offenses and the Criminal




36 Id. at 56.
37 F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 202 (1960) (“[T]here commenced a
major reversal of intellectual trends; the conceptions of liberalism, with the
Rechtsstaat as its main goal, were abandoned [in Germany].  It was in the 1870s
and 1880s . . . that the new movement toward state socialism and the welfare state
began to gather force.  There was, in consequence, little willingness to implement
the conception of limited government . . . .”).
38 GERARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 368 (ass’n Henri Capitant 2006)(“Situ-
ation resultant, pour une socie´te´, de sa soumission a` un ordre juridique excluant
l’aranchie et law justice prive´e. b. En un sens plus restraint, nom que me´rite seul un
ordre juridique dans lequel le respect du Droit est re´element garanti aux sujets de
doit, not contre l’arbitraire.”)(translation author).
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second definition refers to a guarantee of civil rights, and the guaran-
tee that laws will be applied equally.  It does not indicate that it is the
law and not the government that is sovereign, as in the traditional
Anglo-American definition.39
Not only is there a difference in the definition of the rule of law
between common law and civilian tradition, but there is also a differ-
ence in the conception of how one should think about law itself.40  Eu-
ropean civilians at one time believed, “almost as an article of faith,
that a single, complete, coherent and logical system of law” to govern
all legal relationships is possible, and that the human mind is capable
of thinking it out.41  Thus, the focus of the Enlightenment Movement
as promulgated in the Civil Codes was on legal theory: making the law
transparent and organized, incorporating natural law and natural
rights theories, and ensuring that order was kept and that the govern-
ment applied laws equally and consistently.  The focus was not on lim-
iting government (except for separation of powers).
3. COMMON LAW HERITAGE
The historic focus of the British concept, in contrast to the civil-
ian focus on theory, was on preserving existing practice and limiting
governmental power.  However, the development of the United States
variant adapted and incorporated some natural law theories into the
British concept.  If the primary difference between the common law
and the civilian conception of the rule of law is the focus on limiting
government, then it is this characteristic of the common-law heritage
which likely promulgates governmental stability and effectiveness.
A. The Development of the Rule of Law Concept in Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Century Britain
The British understanding of the rule of law in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries consisted of several elements, the first of
which was the general principle that “individuals should be governed
by law rather than by the arbitrary will of others.”42  Two principles
39 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
40 See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 69
(Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1998) (“On the Continent the develop-
ment since the reception of Roman law has been quite different, from the interpre-
tation of Justinian’s Corpus Iuris to the codification, nation by nation, of abstract
rules.”).
41 Woodfin L. Butte, Stare Decisis, Doctrine, and Jurisprudence in Mexico and
Elsewhere, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN
MIXED JURISDICTIONS 311, 315 (Joseph Dainow ed.,1974).
42 Guri Ademi, Legal Intimations: Michael Oakeshott and the Rule of Law, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 839, 844.
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explain this supremacy of law concept: first, that the purpose of the
rule of law doctrine is to “restrain the arbitrary exercise of power,”43
and “that the rule of law by its very existence and its enforcement em-
ploys ‘institutional restraints.’”44 Two such institutional restraints in-
cluded the writ of habeas corpus (wherein a court has the power to
order the government to produce the plaintiff) and a  trial by jury.
Thus, traditionally the rule of law “denies arbitrary power to the gov-
ernment by requiring that no person be made to suffer in body or goods
unless by regular legal process.”45 Thus, the focus of the British con-
cept of the rule of law was on procedure and process as opposed to
written, substantive law.
Another element of the British understanding of the rule of law
was certainty: that government must be conducted in accordance with
established and performable norms, and that the “law [must] be bind-
ing on the ruled and ruler alike.”46  This principle of equality before
the law leads to the principle that the law must not ignore individuals:
Laws, in a Free State, are the standing Defense of the
People, by these alone they ought to be judged, and none
enacted but such as are impartially conceived; the Peer
should possess no Privilege destructive of the Common;
the Layman obtain no Favour which is denied the Priest;
nor the Necessitous excluded from the Justice which is
granted to the Wealthy.47
John Locke similarly stated that established laws are “not to be varied
in particular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the
Favorite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough.”48  In addition to
limits on governmental powers by institutional restraints and equal
application of the law to both citizen and ruler through due process,
the British concept of rule of law meant that “the law must be both
publicly announced and publicly known in advance of application.”49
Civil law tradition emphasizes the latter concept through the codifica-
43 REID, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting CONRAD RUSSELL, CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH
CIVIL WAR 138 (1990)).
44 Id. at 4.
45 Ralph H. Clover, The Rule of Law in Colonial Massachusetts, 108 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1001, 1001 (1960) (emphasis added).
46 REID, supra note 1, at 5.
47 JOHN SHEBBEARE, A SECOND LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND ON FOREIGN
SUBSIDIES, SUBSIDIARY ARMIES, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES TO THIS NATION 17 (3d
ed. 1756).
48 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: A CRITICAL EDITION WITH AN IN-
TRODUCTION AND APPARATUS CRITICUS  § 142 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1967) (1690).
49 REID, supra note 1, at 5.
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tion movement, but there is traditionally less focus on the procedural
component.
Possibly the most “English” aspect of seventeenth and eight-
eenth century rule of law doctrine, in addition to the focus on due pro-
cess, was the “elusive maxim that rule-of-law best promotes liberty by
regulating and restraining state authority,” and that the ordinary law
of the land, established in the courts, protected the right to personal
liberty and public meeting.50  Some of those restraints included the
seventeenth century concepts of the supremacy of law and separation
of powers: the King did not have the authority to have someone ar-
rested without following certain procedures or the power to authorize
anyone to break the law,51 the tasks and authorities of the rulers must
be separated into legislative and executive, and the judiciary must be
independent.52 It was the independent British judiciary that estab-
lished personal liberty through particular cases brought before them,
rather than any stated general principles in a written constitution.
Thus, the source of the British rule of law concept (i.e. the unwritten
British constitution) was the strength of law as measured by its con-
tinuity and practice over a substantial period of time, not in abstract
theory.53
In contrast to this grounding in practice and view of govern-
mental powers as limited prevalent among seventeenth century Brit-
ish common lawyers, continental legal scholars of the time theorized
that the “law should be nothing more than the command of the sover-
eign.”54 Although William Sherlock restated this theory in 1684, and
other legal British legal theorists may have concluded that the rule of
law was a fiction, common lawyers untrained in Roman law were not
familiar with this argument.55  In fact, Frederick William Maitland
said that this theory of absolute monarchy “shocked mankind,” mean-
50 Id. at 6.
51 LOCKE, supra note 48, at 421 (“For the King’s Authority being given him only by
the Law, he cannot impower anyone to act against the Law, or justifie him, by his
Commission in so doing.”).  The limitations on the British king’s power to arrest
(preserved in the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment) predated the Magna
Carta; the Magna Carta only restated limitations already established under ex-
isting practice and precedent. REID, supra note 1, at 6.
52 See Sir William Holdsworth, Book Review, 55 LAW Q. REV. 585, 587 (1939).
53 See SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 10 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 647-49 (1938);
Reid, supra note 1, at 8-9 (citing A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 179 (6th ed. 1902)).
54 REID, supra note 1, at 20 (quoting GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW:
FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 106 (Melbourne University Press
1988)).
55 Id.
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ing that it shocked common lawyers.56  Early positivist theory made
far less of an impact on sixteenth and seventeenth-century British
common lawyers than it would on later generations of legal scholars.
Eighteenth century lawyers had “little opportunity to absorb the no-
tion that the law might be the dictates of the will and pleasure of a
person or government rather than an autonomous, learned, taught
way of thinking about precedents, process, judicial jurisdiction, and
immemorial custom.”57
B. U.S. Founding Fathers, Constitution Drafting, and the Rule of
Law58
Traditionally, the British conception of law was centered
around court-made law; legislation was regarded suspiciously as an
inroad into the common law and so interpreted narrowly.59  The prin-
ciples stated in the Magna Carta, for example, were part of the unwrit-
ten British Constitution even prior to their establishment in a formal
document.60  Because legislation was limited in scope and amount, the
rule of law developed to a great extent out of judicial practices.  The
U.S. experience contains a similar mixture of structural checks and
balances, though founded on a written, rather than unwritten, consti-
tution.61 This similar mixture of structural checks and balances as
well as a focus on the judiciary works to support limited government
and the rule of law.62
The U.S. Constitution was drafted in the summer of 1787 by
representatives from twelve of the original thirteen colonies (with
Rhode Island being the exception).63  Their mandate was simply to
propose amendments to the existing Articles of Confederation that
would strengthen the fledgling country: enable it to defend itself and
pay its army.  Instead, in a hot, closed room in the Pennsylvania State
House, the Philadelphia Convention drafted an entirely new constitu-
tion.  At the time of this drafting, the delegates were experienced in
56 Id. at 21 (citing F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: A
COURSE OF LECTURES DELIVERED 101 (Cambridge University Press 1908)).
57 Id.
58 See generally HAYEK, supra note 30, at 176-196 (discussing the American
contribution to the development of the rule of law).
59 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 1 THE HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I XXV (Little, Brown 2d ed. 1899).
60 Id.
61 For a discussion of the U.S. system of checks and balances, see THE FEDERALIST
No. 51 (James Madison).
62 Id.
63 See generally RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN HONEST MEN (2009); CATHERINE
DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILAELPHIA:  THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (1986).
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constitution drafting – each state had a constitution, some of the states
had drafted more than one constitution, and a number of the delegates
had participated in the drafting of their state constitutions.  No fewer
than five plans were debated at the Philadelphia Convention, the pri-
mary focus being on how to balance federal legislative power and state
representation and reach a consensus.  Concerns described in the Fed-
eralist Papers and the Antifederalist criticisms included worry that
the federal government would become too strong and would promul-
gate too much legislation.  Having experienced the effects of poorly-
promulgated state legislation and corrupt state governments, dele-
gates to the Convention wanted to make it difficult for the federal leg-
islature to pass laws.  They also wanted to limit executive power so as
to avoid what they regarded as the tyranny they believed they had
experienced under British rule.  As a result, they wanted to draft a
structure that would require the three branches of government to po-
lice themselves and each other.  In keeping with the mandate of the
Declaration of Independence, they believed that government’s power is
premised on the consent of the governed and that individual rights are
primary and inalienable:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed, — That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Gov-
ernment, laying its foundation on such principles and or-
ganizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.64
These are essentially the same Enlightenment and Natural
Law values that inspired the French Revolution, and in fact, France’s
first Constitution65 was patterned after the U.S. Constitution.  Thus,
both systems adopted governments with three co-equal branches – a
legislative, an executive, and a judicial branch – and each branch ap-
parently serves similar functions (the legislative branch promulgates
laws, the executive enforces them, and the judiciary adjudges dis-
64 U.S. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
65 The current constitution is France’s fifth.  The Constitution of the Fifth Repub-
lic was passed by a public referendum in 1962, having been put forth by Charles
de Gaulle, who was President at the time. E.g., Fifth Republic, Britannica Online
Encyclopedia, available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/206499/
Fifth-Republic.
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putes).66  Concerning the rule of law itself, as opposed to the structure
of government, the Americanized version is probably most famously
stated by Lon Fuller: the law should consist of (1) general rules that
are (2) publicly promulgated; (3) prospective; (4) understandable; (5)
non-contradictory; (6) possible to comply with; (7) stable; and (8) ad-
ministered as announced.67  This explanation, however, seems to re-
late primarily to legislated law, which has become regarded as
primary law in any legal system.  The rule of law, however, goes be-
yond the mechanics of government set forth in a Constitution, and it
goes beyond legislative law.  Judicial guarantees form a significant
part of the common law conception of the rule of law.
C. The U.S. Adversarial System
In addition to adopting some components of Natural Law the-
ory, the Founding Fathers largely adopted the same adversarial judi-
cial system and substantive law that they had inherited from Great
Britain, having faith in its systematic transparency and accountabil-
ity. In common law tradition, the primary source of law is law derived
from judicial opinions.  The British, since the twelfth century, have
kept records of judicial opinions under the doctrine of stare decisis –
that factually similar cases should be decided similarly.68  Given a
two- or three-level court system, trial judges are therefore accountable
for their decisions:  they need to justify them in written opinions which
are then published and subject to reversal by a higher court.69  These
published opinions are then studied by later courts, attorneys, and law
66 1791 CONST. art. III (Fr.); THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).  Accumu-
lating political power in a single branch is “the very definition of tyranny,” and
separation of powers is an “essential precaution in favor of liberty.” Id.  The Con-
stitution thus divides governmental power among three branches, each with sepa-
rate spheres of authority.  The powers were not divided “strictly but rather
overlapped and comingled them to create a revolutionary system of checks and
balances.”  Heather P. Scribner, A Fundamental Misconception of Separation of
Powers: Boumediene v. Bush, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 90, 94 n. 24 (2009).  For
example, the “power to wage war was traditionally a function of the Executive
Branch alone, but the Framers divided [it] between the Executive and Legislative
Branches, in order to better serve the people.” Id.  For a discussion of the Federal-
ist Papers, the U.S. separation of powers, and checks and balances innovations,
see id. at 94-97.
67 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-91 (Yale University Press 1964).
68 See DANIEL HENRY CHAMBERLAIN, THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS: ITS REA-
SONS AND ITS EXTENT 6-7 (1885).
69 See Gilbert S. Merritt, Judges on Judging: The Decision Making Process in Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1392-94 (1990).
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students in a continuing effort to state principles derived from prac-
tice, not vague theory.70
A primary difference between common law and civilian legal
system has been that civilian jurisdictions in general limit the authori-
tativeness of judicial decisions.71  Traditionally, civilian jurisdictions
regard stare decisis as having led to contradictory and non-transpar-
ent legal doctrine. The importance of jurisprudence varies widely from
civilian jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but in general, judicial opinions are
not written in such detail or published as consistently as in common
law jurisdictions.72
In addition to stare decisis and substantive common law, the
Founding Fathers incorporated the rights of habeas corpus,73 manda-
mus, adversarial procedure, and the jury into the Constitution.74 All of
these act as checks on governmental powers – a fact sadly unrecog-
nized in much policy analysis of the U.S. government.  A writ of habeas
corpus gives the court the power to order the government (specifically
the executive branch) to deliver up a person who was unjustifiably in-
carcerated.  A writ of mandamus similarly is an order “issued by a su-
perior court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform
mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly.”75
In the United States, a court’s docket is set by a clerk of court,
who assigns cases to judges randomly in an effort to protect the system
against corruption.  Judges have little or no control over these assign-
ments.  Judges are required to recuse themselves if they have a con-
flict of interest with a party in the matter before them,76 and litigants
faced with a judge whose fairness they can find some colorable reason
to challenge are quick to demand such recusal.  Similarly, the court’s
budgetary matters are controlled by an independent agency, and not
under the control of the judges themselves.
Under common law adversarial procedure, in both civil and
criminal trials, one party is pitted against the other, and the judge acts
as an umpire until he or the jury reaches the final decision.77 The
70 See id.
71 See Wayne L. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future Inter-
national Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 723-25 (2005).
72 Id.
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
74 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
76 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2010) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge]
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned.”).
77 Gerald Walpin, Law and Truth: Panel III: Truth, the Jury, and the Adversarial
System: America’s Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 177 (2003).
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judge and jury sit on a raised platform, while the adversaries stand at
a lower level to argue their cases.  Thus, in a criminal trial, neither the
defense nor the prosecution appears to be favored by the court.  Simi-
larly, in a civil trial, both the plaintiff and the defendant stand before
the court while presenting their cases.  In both instances, the trial
takes place orally, in one sitting.78  The jury is free to act as a check on
the government or on big business, so that an individual litigant has
the reassurance that he is being judged by his peers, that the court is
not corrupted or biased against him, and that his arguments will be
fairly heard by those who will put common sense and fairness ahead of
fancy legal arguments or the power of either politics or money.
In criminal trials, the presumption is that the accused is inno-
cent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.79  The jury’s man-
date is to determine whether or not the factual evidence presented by
the prosecutor, as offset by the rebuttal evidence presented by the de-
fense, proves guilt to that requisite level.  Once sequestered, a jury’s
deliberations are secret and protected.  Thus, even if a jury suspects
that the defendant is in fact guilty, if it believes the government’s ac-
tions were unjustifiable, it can acquit the defendant and that decision
will be upheld and cannot be appealed.  This premise of “jury nullifica-
tion” is commonly understood as the reason O.J. Simpson was acquit-
ted of killing his ex-wife and her friend – the jury was so offended by
perceived racism in the Los Angeles police department that it refused
to find him guilty.80
As with criminal trials, the jury in a civil trial acts as a check
on the power of big government or big business.  The United States is
the only country that still maintains a jury in civil trials.81 The percep-
tion of the rest of the world may be that legal arguments are too com-
plex for ordinary people to understand them.  However, as one
prominent American judge recently said:
The [civil] jury system is one of the best parts of our legal
system.  It is the preeminent opportunity for the average
citizen to interact and understand the court.  While the
general public understands the legislative and executive
branches, the judiciary and the jury system is mystical to
them.  They are generally petrified when called to serve
78 See Merritt, supra note 69, at 1386.
79 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-459 (1895) (discussing the presump-
tion of innocence and reasonable doubt).
80 See generally W. William Hodes, Reform: The Lawyers: Lord Brougham,The
Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075
(1996).
81 See, e.g., Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal
Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 406 (1992).
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on a jury.  However, once they have served, citizens enjoy
a newfound respect for the system.  And the litigants
gain respect for the system as well because their case
was not decided by a judge, but by their peers.  Concern-
ing a jury’s ability to understand a case, there is no case
so complicated that it cannot be explained by capable at-
torneys and judges.  Wonderful things can be done with
modern technology and creative presentations.  Jurors
are smarter than they are often given credit for, and can
cut to the chase.  They may not be able to articulate legal
nuances, but more often than not they get to the right
decision even in the most complicated cases.82
Though they generally try hard to follow the law and decide a
case fairly, jury decisions in civil matters often favor “the little guy.”
For example, a jury imposed an incredibly large civil damages penalty
against McDonald’s when it decided that the multinational enterprise
had behaved callously in dealing with a little old lady who had been
burned by its superheated coffee.83  Similarly, class action suits pro-
vide a way in which small complainants can combine to bring their
complaints against huge companies before a jury, as with the tobacco
actions.  Even judges in the United States to tend to favor an individ-
ual faced in court with an overwhelmingly powerful adversary.  The
effects of such litigation may not always be beneficial for society in
general.  Nevertheless, civil juries act as a check against both a power-
ful governmental entity and powerful, moneyed entities in the United
States and thus they contribute significantly to the rule of law.
D. Judicial Review
Much scholarship has been devoted to the role that judicial re-
view plays in the U.S. system of checks and balances.  As a result,
many civilian jurisdictions (perhaps under the impression that judicial
review is the primary limitation on legislative power in the United
82 Nadia E. Nedzel, Interview with Judge Carl E. Stewart of the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, AROUND THE BAR, Mar. 2009, at 11.
83 Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL
360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994); see also Kevin G. Cain, And Now the Rest
of the Story . . . The McDonald’s Coffee Lawsuit, 11 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 14, 17-
18 (2007), (explaining the facts of the case that led the jury to award punitive
damages of $2.7 million, calculated on its understanding that this amount repre-
sented about two days worth of McDonald’s coffee revenues).  McDonald’s knew its
superheated coffee was dangerous, knew that about 700 customers had been seri-
ously burned by it, but concluded that the number of hot coffee burns were “statis-
tically insignificant” as compared to coffee sales, and deliberately refused to either
turn down the heat or warn customers. Id. at 16-17.
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States) have created courts whose job it is to determine whether a par-
ticular statute is or is not in keeping with the pertinent constitution.84
Judicial review is one of the checks and balances that has become the
hallmark of the American legal system, and while it is important, it is
only one of a number of institutional mechanisms that obliges govern-
ments in the U.S. to “police” themselves.
Judicial review, however, is not part of the U.S. Constitution.
Instead, it is a doctrine that (in keeping with common law tradition)
developed out of Marbury v. Madison.85 This case was the result of a
political battle between out-going President John Adams (of the Feder-
alist Party) and the newly elected Thomas Jefferson (from the Demo-
cratic Republican Party).86
The Constitution established only one federal court – the Su-
preme Court.87  The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to hear writs of mandamus88  and added district
and circuit courts.89 Twelve years later, Adams wanted to stymie the
incoming Democratic Congress.90  Consequently, in the first court-
packing plan in U.S. history, lame-duck Adams and the Federalist-
controlled Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801 creating a num-
ber of new federal courts (ten new district courts, three new circuit
courts, a number of new justice-of-the-peace positions).91  The 1801
Act also added additional judges to each circuit, giving the President
the authority to appoint Federal judges and justices of the peace.92 Af-
ter appointing all of these new judges (so quickly that they were
termed “Midnight Judges”),93 Adams asked Secretary of State John
Marshall (who had been recently appointed Chief Justice of the Su-
84 David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J.
723, 747-751 (2009) (discussing why courts are efficient monitors of government).
85 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803).
86 The story behind Marbury v. Madison is well known. See John F. Preis, Consti-
tutional Enforcement by Proxy, 995 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1693-94 (2009); see also Ma-
jor Kevin W. Landtroop, Book Review: The Great Decision, 2009 ARMY LAW. 53, 53
(2009) (discussing the political maneuvering that led to the dispute); Law, supra
note 78 (discussing the role of judicial review in supporting the rule of law);
Scribner, supra note 59, at 97-101 (discussing Marshall’s understanding of the
separation of powers as well as his political maneuvering in reasoning through the
decision).
87 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
88 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 13.
89 Id. at §§ 2-3.
90 See James E´tienne Viator, Marbury & History: What Do We Really Know About
What Really Happened?, 37 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 329, 338 (2003).
91 Id. For an especially well-told and careful accounting of the political story be-
hind Marbury, see id. at 335-43.
92 Id. at 338.
93 Id. at 338-339.
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preme Court, but had yet to ascend to the bench) to deliver the ap-
pointments.94  Marshall did not have enough time to deliver all of the
appointments prior to Jefferson’s swearing in, and incoming President
Jefferson ordered the new Secretary of State, James Madison, (a Dem-
ocrat) not to deliver the remainder.95
President Adams had appointed William Marbury, an ardent
Federalist, as Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia.96  Mar-
bury petitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ of mandamus
to force Madison deliver his appointment.97  John Marshall was now
Chief Justice and was facing threats of impeachment by the now Dem-
ocratic Congress should the Supreme Court decide the “wrong” way.
The Court denied Marbury’s petition, holding that the Judiciary Act of
1789 was unconstitutional insofar as it expanded the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to include original jurisdiction over writs of mandamus.98
Consequently, although the Supreme Court held that Marbury was
due his appointment because he had a “vested” right in it, there was
nothing the Supreme Court could do about it.99  In the meantime, the
new Congress reversed the Judiciary Act of 1801 with its own Judici-
ary Act of 1802.100
Thus, in a masterful piece of political maneuvering – and some
quirky legalistic reasoning — Chief Justice John Marshall founded the
premise for judicial review.101 Marbury v. Madison held that the Su-
preme Court is obligated to make sure that statutes passed by Con-
gress that deal with judicial powers are within the limitations set by
the Constitution, if the constitutionality of the statute is questioned in
a court case.  The language used, however, has since been interpreted
94 Id. at 339.
95 Preis, supra note 87, at 1693.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 In Marbury, Justice Marshall set forth a straight-forward three-step ruling: 1)
the delivery of Marbury’s commission was merely incidental to the appointment
which had vested when signed by President Adams and sealed by (then) Secretary
of State Marshall, and therefore President Jefferson’s Secretary of State (James
Madison) was not legally warranted to withhold it.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(Cranch 1) 137, 157-62 (1803).  2) It was the duty of a government of laws to supply
remedies for violated rights, such as Marbury’s right to his commission. Id. at
162-168.  3) However, the requested mandamus was not an appropriate legal rem-
edy because the statute Marbury relied on (the Judiciary Act of 1789) impermissi-
bly enlarged the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in violation of Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 179-80; see also Viator, supra note 91, at 343-45.
99  Marbury, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137.
100 Viator, supra note 90, at 341.
101 Id. at 345-46 (stating that Marshall’s opinion was “among the craftiest in con-
stitutional history”).
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as a broad power to determine the constitutionality of any statute
brought before it.102  That being said, however, judicial review is in
practice used only rarely to limit legislative and executive powers.  The
underlying basis of the U.S. legal system is still that the three
branches of government share equal powers.103  A court must defer to
legislative and executive discretion unless the statute’s constitutional-
ity is directly called into question and there is no other basis on which
to make the decision brought before it.  Consequently, judicial review
may not be nearly as important or powerful a check on governmental
powers as it has been touted to be.104  It acts in concert with other
mechanisms, including the ones mentioned previously, to limit govern-
mental powers, whether legislative, executive, or judicial.
The previous discussion of the political tale behind Marbury v.
Madison shows the extent to which procedure and practice can over-
come and balance out the pressures of politicization, where the rule of
law is regarded as supreme, over and above all governmental power.
Marshall, though appointed by Adams, nevertheless articulated a deci-
sion that undoubtedly went against both his personal wishes and the
wishes of the person who nominated him to his office.  This decision,
grounded in a fierce political battle, has since become one of the
hallmarks of the U.S. tradition of an independent judiciary.
4. THE ROMANISTIC105 CIVILIAN HERITAGE
A. Founding Generals, Not Founding Fathers
As stated by Chilean economist Jose Pin˜era, the United States
had Founding Fathers, but Latin America had Founding Generals.106
His statement was more true than even he thought: the Civilian Tradi-
102 See David E. Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence? Original
Intentions and the History of Marbury v. Madison, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1041 (2006)
(discussing the interpretation and use of Marbury by the Supreme Court).
103 But see generally Scribner, supra note 66 (acknowledging the traditional shar-
ing of powers among the three branches and criticizing recent U.S. Supreme Court
for overstepping Constitutional limits of power and failing to maintain the separa-
tion of powers).
104 But see generally FULLER, supra note 67 (arguing that judicial review is instru-
mental in preserving separation of powers and governmental overreaching).
105  Most methods of categorizing legal systems involve some inaccuracy and are
therefore of limited value. See ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 63-68.
However, based on historical development, the systems of the European continent
can be divided into a Germanic family (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, etc.) and a
Romanistic family (including “France and all the systems which adopted the
French Civil Code, along with Spain Portugal, and South America”). Id. at 68-69.
Consequently, it is mostly the Romanistic family that is being discussed in this
article using this categorization method.
106 Jose Pinera, Latin America: A Way Out, 22 CATO J. 409, 410 (2003).
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tion in its modern form began with General Napoleon Bonaparte’s
Projet.
Although Napoleon was responsible for the first Civil Code, the
foundational basis of the Civilian tradition is the Corpus Juris Civilis
compiled by Roman Emperor Justinian I between 529 and 534 A.D.
and known as Justinian’s Digest.107  Lost for centuries, it was redis-
covered in Northern Italy and gradually replaced or supplemented oral
legal traditions throughout Europe.  It was separate and apart from
Church or canon law, and was first taught at the University of
Bologna in the eleventh century, from there it spread to other univer-
sities where it was taught through the High Middle Ages.  An underly-
ing premise of Roman Law is the concept of the ruler as being above
the law.  However, beginning with Henry II and his disagreement with
Thomas Beckett, England rejected Roman law and abstract rules, rely-
ing instead on judge-made law.108
In the Age of Reason (the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries), a “new secular natural law” theory arose that was based partly
on demands for individual rights and partly on a theory that law could
be organized and reasoned using methods comparable to Euclidean ge-
ometry.109 Secular natural law assumed that the prince’s power to leg-
islate was limited, and hence first questioned and then rejected the
“dogma of absolute sovereignty.”110 Rousseau further theorized that
strict separation of powers was needed in order to limit government
and protect individual rights.111  Montesquieu, on whose reasoning the
U.S. Constitution was based, also advocated for the separation of pow-
ers, but not as didactically as Rousseau.112  The growth of these ideas–
and the excesses and inefficiency of Louis XVI’s reign– led to the
French Revolution.113
The European conception developed out of the French Revolu-
tion’s rejection of the pre-revolutionary rigid social structure and tur-
gid legal system, out of its adoption of the language of rights (liberte´,
107 See ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 75.
108 Id. at 69. NADIA NEDZEL, LEGAL REASONING, RESEARCH, AND WRITING FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL GRADUATE STUDENTS 13 (Aspen Publishers 2004).
109 John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style I: Doctrine, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39, 53-
54 (1965).
110 Id.
111 Aside from his separation of power theory, Rousseau’s understanding of the
etat de droit further shows not only that it is not the same as the rule of law be-
cause it does not recognize the necessity to limit government, but also that this
conception can lead to tyranny. See BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS
106-107 n.1 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988).
112 See generally CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989).
113 See, e.g., id.
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egalite´, fraternite´), and out of the Revolution’s focus on the develop-
ment of an organized, logically-coherent and transparent system of
laws (the civil code).114  Once France was stabilized under his Empire,
Napoleon undertook to replace the rejected pre-revolutionary law by
appointing an expert commission to draft the Civil Code.115  Using
natural law theories as well as principles developed from Justinian’s
Digest, the Commission led by Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis drafted
the Code Napole´on in the second half of 1801.116  Napoleon himself
attended 57 of the commission’s 102 meetings.117  Although the draft
was completed at the end of 1801, the Code was not published until
March 31, 1804.118
The Civil Code contains a typically Napoleonic mix of liber-
alism and conservatism, although most of the basic revolutionary
gains—equality before the law, freedom of religion and the abolition of
feudalism—were consolidated within its laws.119  Property rights, in-
cluding the rights of those who had purchased previously state-owned
property were made absolute.120 Additionally, Napoleon intended that
the Code be written in such a way that it could easily be read by the
common man.121 The result was a Code that was (and remains) ele-
gant in its brevity and simplicity, transparent, comprehensible, acces-
sible, well-written, logical, and consistent.  Once published, the Code
was promulgated throughout the Empire.  General Napoleon Bona-
parte considered the Civil Code to be the most significant of his
achievements: “It is not in winning 40 battles that my real glory lies,
for all those victories will be eclipsed by Waterloo. But my Code civil
will not be forgotten, it will live forever.”122
In pre-revolutionary France, the judiciary had been the object
of much hatred because judicial office was akin to a property right that
could be bought, sold, or inherited, and because, as a result judicial
decisions tended to be arbitrary, and judges refused to be subject to the
law. Thus, the French thinking of the time was that strict separation
of powers was needed, as it was necessary to take lawmaking power
away from judges completely and lodge it in a representative legisla-
114 EDUARDO GARCI´A DE ENTERRI´A, LA LENGUA DE LOS DERECHOS, LA FORMACIO´N
DEL DERECHO PU´BLICO EUROPEO TRAS LA REVOLUCIO´N FRANCESA 26-42, 151-152
(Alianza Universidad 2d ed. 1995)
115 ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 82.
116 See id. at 82-89.
117 Id. at 83.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 86-87.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 83.
122 Id. at 84.
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ture in order to prevent the recurrence of these abuses.123  The judicial
function had to be restricted to mere mechanical application of the
law.124  Consequently, the dominant thinking was that the legislative
text of each article of the Code, if literally studied, should provide the
answer to every problem that might arise concerning it.  Normative
standards as stated in a Civil Code were to be stated “with such clarity
and over so broad a range of issues that their application to individual
cases would require no creative activity on the part of the judge.”125
Thus, the function of the judge was to find and apply the applicable
provision and it would be wrong for him to go outside the Code to look
for aid in selection and application.
After the Civil Code’s rise in France, similar natural-law based
Codes were adopted worldwide to such an extent that ninety percent of
all countries can now be called civilian or “code-based.” These coun-
tries traditionally minimize judge-made law in keeping with this civil-
ian tradition.  The most influential civil codes have been the French,
the German, and the Swiss codes.  Louisiana’s Code, based on the lan-
guage of the French Civil Code, but incorporating legal principles of
then existent Spanish colonial law, was adopted in 1808 when Louisi-
ana’s citizens made it known to Thomas Jefferson that they would not
accept common law (though they did accept common law proce-
dure).126  Andre Bello used both the French Civil Code and Louisiana’s
Civil Code (similarly combined with indigenous elements of Spanish
law) in drafting the Chilean Civil Code of 1855, and it was later
adopted as a whole in El Salvador, Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Colombia, and Honduras.127 Bello’s Code also  influenced the codes of
Uruguay, Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Paraguay.128  The 1896
Civil Code of Germany (the Bergerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB) was built
on the same principles, but incorporated Pandectist thinking, result-
ing in a much denser, longer code.129  The BGB (and through it the
123 See id. at 89.
124 Id.
125 Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Proce-
dure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 494 (1975).
126 ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 116.
127 M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andres Bello’s Use of
the Code Napoleon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291, 291
(2001); see also ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 114 (discussing Bello’s draft-
ing of the Chilean Code, drawing on Roman legal tradition, the French Code, Las
Siete Partidas (Spanish colonial law), and Savigny’s thinking).
128 Id.; M.C. Mirow, Individual Experience in Legal Change: Exploring a Neglected
Factor in Nineteenth-Century Latin American Codification, 11 SW. J.L. AND TRADE
AM. 301 (2005); M.C. Mirow, The Code Napole´on: Buried but Ruling in Latin
America, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 179, 184 (2005).
129 See ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 144-45.
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French Civil Code) inspired codes in Brazil and Argentina as well as
codes in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, the
USSR, and even China and Japan.130 Turkey adopted the Swiss Code
wholesale in 1926.131
B. Civilian Inquisitorial Procedure
Civilian criminal procedure differs from common law procedure
just as civilian legal theory differs from common law theory.  In fact,
the procedural differences are likely more significant with regard to
the rule of law than the substantive differences.  Inquisitorial proce-
dure developed out of the administrative (or “police”) powers exercised
by feudal and Renaissance kings.132  In keeping with Roman tradition,
the king’s police power was based on his authority to command his
subjects and seemed to be outside the realm of law.  Over time, power
became more centralized, rulers dispatched officials to exercise their
control, and gradually a stratified bureaucracy emerged.133  In parts of
Europe “where feudal fragmentation caused disruptions, the emerging
central rule became associated with order and stability . . . [which led
to] the concept of absolutist monarchy.”134  The absolutist monarchies
prevalent in the eighteenth century were called “police states precisely
for this reason: even enlightened despotism depended on the good in-
tentions of a monarch . . . who could decide unilaterally about the fate
of his subjects.”135
Even after the French Revolution destroyed the old order, peo-
ple who opposed absolutism still believed in a strong central rule.136
The theory justifying a strong central rule as embodied in inquisitorial
procedure under e´tat le´gal was that the government was acting
“within the realm of its positive freedom to further the welfare of its
subjects” when it was exercising its police powers.137  However, while
criminal courts had jurisdiction over the contraventions de police,
judges had to “apply the volonte´ ge´nerale as embodied in enacted
law.”138  Because of this traditional view of the judiciary as a mere
mechanical function, judicial opinions do not have precedential value
in civilian jurisdictions and are generally still not published, except
perhaps in extremely summary “note” form.
130 See id. at 154-56.
131  Id. at 178.
132 See Hildebrandt, supra note 32, at 53.
133 Damaska, supra note 125, at 540.
134 Id. at 540.
135 Hildebrandt, supra note 32, at 53.
136 Damaska, supra note 125, at 540.
137 Hildebrandt, supra note 32, at 59.
138 Id. at 60.
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Although civilian jurisdictions have since modified their crimi-
nal procedure in a wide variety of ways, there are several key differ-
ences that remain between inquisitorial procedure and adversarial
procedure.  Most obviously, in addition to the fact that civilian jurisdic-
tions generally have not adopted either the practice or the theory of
stare decisis,139 since the civilian criminal process developed out of the
executive’s police power, it was traditionally envisioned in civilian ju-
risdictions as an active state investigation, not as a contest between
parties.140  In the inquisitorial system, truth must be determined by
gathering all available evidence.141  In contrast, in an adversarial sys-
tem, truth is a “determination of which opposed position [is] more
likely to be correct[;] . . . —[it is] a matter of plausibility, mature judg-
ment, and of balancing two versions of a given event against each
other.”142  Commentators have remarked that the U.S. adversarial
system may be better suited to protect civil liberties under normal cir-
cumstances, but that the French inquisitorial system is better suited
in times of crisis,143 such as war, when a country must act as an enter-
prise association.
Under inquisitorial procedure prior to the nineteenth century,
a single magistrate had immense power: he supervised pretrial inves-
tigation, conducted the hearings at which the evidence was examined,
and determined the outcome.144  The full concentration of procedural
authority in the hands of only one official appears even more shocking
when viewed from a modern perspective.  This is because the inquisi-
torial investigating judge “decided on his own initiative what cases to
process and possessed full authority to determine any issue which in
his opinion required examination.”145  Thus, a judge’s role combined
prosecutorial, defense, and adjudicative functions.146
In the nineteenth century after the enactment of the French
Code d’instruction criminelle in 1808, prosecution and investigation
were separated into  a private state pretrial investigation run by a
prosecutor and the public trial phase, conducted by a judge.147  After
139 Damaska, supra note 125, at 497.
140 Stewart Field, Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe, 29 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 365, 368 (2009).
141 Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and
Adversarial Systems of Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 464 (2009).
142 Id.
143 See Antoine Garapon, The Oak and the Reed: Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms
in France and the United States of America, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2041 (2006).
144 See Field, supra note 141, at 377 (indicating that historians generally agree to
this accounting of European legal history).
145 Damaska supra note 125, at 534-35.
146 Id. at 535.
147 Id.
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1808, the inquisitorial judge “could proceed only on the motion of a
prosecutor, and the subject of his inquiries was limited to the offenses
listed in the prosecutors charge.”148
Generally, in most modern civilian inquisitorial procedures, a
prosecutor has little or no discretion and must press charges as part of
his or her official duty,149 and there are a number of regulations guid-
ing the decision of whether to invoke the criminal process, such as di-
rections as to the point at which property damage becomes minimal.
The extensive internal regulations “reflect the civilian emphasis on
consistency and uniformity of decisions” and thorough review by
superiors150 – i.e. the equal enforcement component of Rechtsstaat.
For the same reasons, all official matters must be documented and the
documentation must follow precise rules.151  Thus, a French judge has
a “dossier” with the relevant facts of the case.152  Documents and re-
ports drafted by officials are highly formalized; exposition must be suc-
cinct and summaries made whenever possible.  Even the style of
writing is standardized, often becoming arid, impersonal, and cliche´-
ridden.153
The judge’s role in a civilian criminal procedure is very differ-
ent from a common law judge’s role.  Although the nineteenth century
vision of decision-making as an automatic process of norm application
has been recognized as a rationalist illusion, it has remained as a reg-
ulating ideal.  Judges have a much more active role, and are not the
mere neutral arbitrators and umpires they are in common law juris-
dictions.154  The judge must amass the  evidence and ensure that it
establishes guilt or innocence.155  Thus, the inquisitorial judge must
take the initiative in calling and questioning witnesses.156  Further,
the judge often questions the accused and “can demand further inquiry
by calling and questioning additional witnesses or requiring further
investigation.”157
Nevertheless, inquisitorial judges are still expected to act as
civil servants, using “professional craftsmanship.”158  When there is no
applicable legislated or regulatory law and “independent action be-
comes unavoidable, it must be exercised sparingly, with extreme mod-
148 Id.
149 Id. at 503.
150 Id. at 504.
151 Id. at 506.
152 Finegan, supra note 141, at 467.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 452.
155 Id. at 466.
156 Id.
157 Id.  at 466-67.
158 Damaska, supra note 125, at 507.
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eration and preferably at the apex of the hierarchy.”159  This
independent action “should never be influenced by political, ethical, or
similar extrinsic values.”160  The most dreaded consequence of exercis-
ing such independence is not the fear of judicial legislation, but the
fear that such decision-making would cause legal uncertainty and the
resulting chaotic law would gradually be politicized.161  A common law
practitioner would counter that this fear is misplaced:  by having to
ground decisions on established law, and because all decisions are in
the public domain, common law judicial decisions are less likely to be
politicized rather than more.
Because they focus on ascertaining one truth by assembling all
available evidence, civilian judges are not significantly restrained by
strict evidentiary rules as are common law judges.  A finder of fact in
the French inquisitorial system is permitted to consider all relevant
information, regardless of its reliability, and to determine which facts
should be given greater weight.162
Another significant difference between the French inquisitorial
system and the U.S. adversarial system is the ability of a defendant to
speak in his own defense and be proactive in the proceedings against
him: he may even be invited by the judge to respond to certain witness
testimony.163 Thus, a defendant is able to testify directly to the judge
without being under oath.164  Under U.S. law, the only way a defen-
dant can speak directly to the judge is by being placed under oath and
testifying on his own behalf.165  Furthermore, he must respond only to
questioning by the attorneys.  Although he can speak for himself, a
defendant subject to a French inquisitorial trial cannot represent him-
self, and must be represented by counsel — in contrast to the U.S.
constitutional right to represent oneself.166
5. PROCEDURE MORE IMPORTANT THAN SUBSTANCE
Both common law and the civilian legal systems have honora-
ble traditions.  Countries looking to adopt new law have tended to
gravitate to the civilian tradition because of its logic, clarity, and or-
ganization.  Common law is typically regarded (with some justifica-
tion) as quirky, disorganized, and incoherent – though flexible.
159 Id. at 507-08.
160 Id. at 508.
161 Id.
162 Finegan, supra note 141, at 468.
163 Id. at 468-69.
164 Id. at 469.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 470.
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Because of its basis in stare decisis, substantive common law is diffi-
cult to adopt.  Written civil law is easier.
One aspect of the common law tradition that may be experienc-
ing more widespread acceptance is procedural – the adversarial tradi-
tion and recognition of jurisprudence as a source of law.  In a number
of civilian countries, jurisprudence has long been a source of law,
though it is usually persuasive rather than mandatory.  For example,
in Mexico, if the Supreme Court decides the same issue five  times the
same way, then that principle has the force of a statute.167  In Switzer-
land, as part of the canton tradition, attorneys must be aware of judi-
cial decisions and consider jurisprudence before advising their clients
(i.e. highly persuasive authority).168  Argentina has adopted a system
of precedent in an effort to reduce the number of appeals.169  In Louisi-
ana and other bi-jural jurisdictions, jurisprudence is often de facto law,
rather than de jure.170
On an international level, article seven of the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods requires that juris-
prudence be interpreted in a manner consistent with good faith and
consistency on an international level.171  Consequently, an entire
database of international decisions is kept by Pace University as well
as the UNIDROIT Library in Rome.172 It has been theorized that there
is an international trend developing toward the adoption of precedent
for four reasons: 1) while jurists from different legal systems may disa-
gree about legal theory, they often agree on the result in an individual
case; 2) a system of precedent adds stability and predictability because
there is some assurance that like cases will be decided similarly; 3)
efficiency is maximized because similar cases will no longer lend them-
selves to multiple appeals; and 4) judges can more easily be held ac-
countable for their decisions.
As demonstrated below, some Latin American legal systems
are adopting other facets of common law procedure, in particular, the
adversarial stance, the judge as arbitrator, and the presumption of in-
nocence, as well as some recognition of precedent.  They are also at-
tempting to strengthen the independence of the judicial branch by
167 Ken Gormley, Symposium, Judicial Review in the Americas: Comments on the
United States and Mexico, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 393, 404 (2007).
168 See, e.g., Fridolin M.R. Walther, Features – Introduction to the Swiss Legal
System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers (2000), http://www.llrx.com/features/
swiss.htm#.
169 See ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 40, at 114; Mirow, supra note 127, at 291.
170 See generally VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED
JURISDICTION (1999).
171 See, e.g., U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. S/1984/98-9, A/CONF 97/19 (Apr. 11, 1980).
172 UNIDROIT Library Homepage, http://library.unidroit.org/English/main.htm.
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incorporating checks and balances inspired by U.S. court procedure
and other sources.  Thus, they are attempting to strengthen the com-
mon law version of the rule of law.
6. PROBLEMS OF LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT
The Spanish Hapsburg monarchs built colonial states in the
sixteenth century  and originally did not need an army because the
political system was “flexible and stable.”173  They governed through
the Council of the Indies, which used a procedure that was “cumber-
some . . . [but] ensured that all interested parties had a chance to par-
ticipate and that decisions were made strategically.”174  Two main
governance principles were employed at the local level: 1) “officials
could selectively ignore royal edicts that would [harm] local interests”
and 2) officials’ jurisdiction “overlapped so that ambition could check
ambition.”175  The “administration was a ‘government of judges, where
nearly every appointed official exercised some sort of judicial author-
ity, . . . . [and] [t]he legal system served as a constant venue of negotia-
tion between distinct groups and individuals.’”176  Informal alliances
“based on ties of  kinship and interest between local elites and royal
bureaucrats” reduced the monarchy’s ability to pursue policies that
would conflict with and check the oligarchy.177  Thus, Latin American
colonial government under the Hapsburgs involved an institution of at
least a modicum of checks and balances.
This changed, however, when the Bourbons took power in
1713.178  The Bourbons regarded the Hapsburg rule as corrupt and
detrimental to economic growth.179  Consequently, they overhauled
the legal system by delineating jurisdictions so that there was no over-
lap of power and no conflict with royal policy.180  The Bourbon reforms
led to  the creation of a “salaried fiscal bureaucracy” which improved
revenue collection and to a military to fend off foreign incursions.181
These reforms also resulted in an administrative, professional bureau-
cracy and created an absolutist state and a standing army.182
173 Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America,
41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 19 (2006).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting CHARLES R. CUTTER, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF NEW SPAIN, 1700-
1810 31 (1995).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 19-20.
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Then, at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nine-
teenth centuries, European monarchies were replaced by republics,
and a legal system arose in which citizens enjoyed equal rights.183
These reforms, however, did not fully reach Latin America.184  Consti-
tutions were written and civil codes adopted, but these new institu-
tions did not transform society.185  Power remained in the hands of the
elites, protected by the military which had grown and was used to pro-
tect against internal unrest led by the poor.186
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with mod-
ernization and the drive to industrialize, oligarchies were overturned
by communist revolutions led by charismatic leaders such as Allende,
who created central governments managing vast bureaucratic organi-
zations that controlled “virtually all aspects of the economy.”187  They
in turn would be replaced by military coup and charismatic fascist
leaders who took the same approach.188  The framers of constitutions
in this era “sought to centralize power in the hands of the president in
an attempt to steer a path between tyranny and anarchy.”189  Conse-
quently, they allocated excessive power to the presidents, but short-
ened term limits to help prevent military coups, leading to two
unintended consequences.190  First, by shortening term limits, it be-
came difficult to reach the consensus needed to address pressing social
problems.191  Presidents fearing coups and unrest would frequently
strengthen their power by giving cronies strategic positions.192  Addi-
tionally, presidents feared losing their positions and were willing to
bend or break election rules to prevent their replacement.193  These
changes resulted in “societ[ies] in which businesses sought favors in
the political arena rather than compet[ing] in the market.”194  Because
the bureaucracy settled economic disputes, there was “no need for an
impartial judiciary to settle disputes between private litigants . . .
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See id. at 20.
186 Id. at 21.
187 See id. at 20-22.
188 See id. at 34 n.223.
189 Id. at 29.
190 Id. at 19.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 28-29.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 22.
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[and] the judiciary became a rich source of patronage for the
executive.”195
While the elites were competing to obtain privileges from the
overly bureaucratic state, many of the rural poor migrated to Latin
American cities.196  Because the legal systems were overly complex
and hostile to their interests, they were forced to live in the “black”
sector of the economy, in which they had to “build homes on land they
did not own and engage in . . . trades for which they lacked proper
legal authorization.”197  This governmental dysfunction created the
shantytowns that surround Latin America’s cities.198  Then, in the late
1980s, these overly-centralized Latin American states collapsed, just
as did the overly-centralized Soviet Union, because they failed to pro-
mote development.199  The resulting batch of democracies, however,
still maintained their authoritarian legacy, bureaucracies, weak judi-
ciary, and lack of the institutionalized checks and balances.  In other
words, they still lacked the rule of law.
7. THE HISTORY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN LATIN
AMERICA
“[I]n Peru, . . . we have very good laws, but one is missing: a law
that says that all the other laws should be complied-with.”200
Latin American countries vary widely in terms of governmen-
tal stability, economic development, and other factors.  What they
share, however, are legal systems that are civilian in nature and heri-
tage, and they share common legal roots as either Spanish or Portu-
guese former colonies.  Though some countries such as Chile are now
making progress in terms of economic development and stability,201
over the past century a number of Latin American countries remained
politically unstable, alternating between military and communist rule,
suffering from economic stagnation or even financial collapse.  Their
legal systems continue to be described as weak and outdated, failing to
195 Id. at 22. See generally Joseph R. Thome, Heading South but Looking North:
Globalization and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 691 (2000)
(analyzing the historical role of the Latin American judiciary).
196 Schor, supra note 173, at 22.
197 Id. See also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION
IN THE THIRD WORLD 10-13 (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row 1989).
198 Schor, supra note 173, at 22.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 24 (quoting Nichola`s de Pie´rola, President of Peru, 1895-1899 in Dom-
ingo Garcia Belaunde, Constitutional Processes in Latin America, in CONTEMPO-
RARY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 28 (Ce´sar Landa & Julio Fau´ndez eds., 1996)).
201 See generally Meredith Fensom, Judicial Reform In the Americas: The Case of
Chile 80-100 (2004) (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Florida), available
at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0006263/fensom_m.pdf.
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promulgate either component of the rule of law.202 Most recently, Ven-
ezuela and Bolivia are in a communist rule cycle, while Honduras is
(as of this writing) under a military regime, having ousted its leftist-
oriented president for his attempt to circumvent term limits by calling
an unconstitutional referendum that would extend his presidency.203
In contrast, Chile has been stable, despite the fact that the presidency
changed from right to left after Pinochet left office in 1989 and re-
mained left-oriented until 2009 when conservative Sebastia´n Pin˜era
was elected. These changes occurred without any military interven-
tion, communist take-over, or questionable elections – in this case, Pi-
nochet’s authoritarian regime apparently really did set the stage for a
successful republic.204
A. The First Two Rounds: “Law and Development” and
“Administration of Justice”
Outside agencies from North America and Western European
have attempted to “promote legal reform and development in Latin
202 See Jorge L. Esquirol, Writing the Law of Latin America, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 693, 706, 731 (2009).
203 See SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INST.  A SNAPSHOT
OF LATIN AMERICA TODAY 1-3 (2010), available at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2010
02.purcell.snapshotlatinamerica.html. However, it should be noted that the demo-
cratic institutions of Honduras asked for military intervention because the presi-
dent had been attempting to circumvent constitutional term limits by demanding
a referendum to change the limitation – a referendum ruled unconstitutional by
the Honduran Supreme Court.  Thus, terming Honduras’ situation a “military re-
gime” is probably an overstatement. Id. at 4 (“[T]he [Honduran] military acted at
the request of Honduras’ democratic institutions.  The State Department did not
give the matter sufficient thought and responded to the removal of President
Zelaya in a knee-jerk manner.  And President Obama decided to follow the lead of
the Latin American governments for a variety of reasons – such as their fear that
Venezuela would interfere in the internal affairs of their countries and cause
trouble.  He condemned the ‘traditional military coup’ in Honduras and pressed for
the reinstatement of the deposed president who had provoked the crisis by his
unconstitutional efforts to prolong his presidency.  By focusing only on the behav-
ior of the Honduran military, without considering all that led up to its decision to
remove President Zelaya, the Obama administration missed an opportunity to mo-
bilize democratic Latin America against the threat posed by President Chavez’s
behavior in the region.”)
204 In fact, one of the Pinochet junta’s first acts was to impose the rule of law (i.e.
it limited its own acts).  Robert Barro, Dictatorship and the Rule of Law: Rules and
Military Power in Pinochet’s Chile, in JOSE MARIA MARAVALL AND ADAM PRZEWOR-
SKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 188, 196-97, 211 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2003).  This is likely a substantial reason underlying Chile’s stability, current eco-
nomic success, and success in reforming its criminal justice system.
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America” since the 1960s and before.205  These reform efforts in Latin
America have been grouped in three bands.  In the 1960s and 70s, U.S.
academics formulated a “law and development movement,” proposing
that developing countries adopt a U.S.-style legal system, beginning
with the adoption of U.S.-style law school teaching methodology and a
“public safety programme.”206  The next band, in the 1980s, was in-
tended to be smaller in scope, and was termed the “Administration of
Justice” program.207  Then, in the 1990s, a third “rule of law” band
developed after the collapse of communism.208
The 1960s and 70s law and development projects were unsuc-
cessful in Latin America for a number of reasons: they faced emerging
communist/socialist revolutionary movements, met with resistance
from the existing legal culture, ignored the economic and political im-
pacts on the elite classes, and were “ethnocentric,” ignoring and dis-
missing the civilian heritage.209  However, the initial underlying
assumptions about the requirements of modern society remain influ-
ential.  It was thought that in order to develop, a culture needs to
demonstrate: 1) “openness to new experience, both with people and
with new ways of doing things”;  2) “increasing independence from the
authority of traditional figures like parents and priests and a shift of
allegiance” to governmental and other leaders; 3) “belief in the efficacy
of science and medicine”; 4) “ambition for oneself and one’s children to
achieve high occupational and educational goals”; 5) a concern for be-
ing on time and planning affairs in advance; 6) “strong interest in . . .
civic and community affairs”; and 7) energetically keeping up with the
“news of national and international import.”210
The second initiative began in the mid-1980s after Congress
began criticizing human rights abuses in El Salvador.211  The Kis-
singer Commission on Central America recommended that Congress
address the issue by funding the “Administration of Justice Pro-
gramme.”212  Under this approach, large grants were awarded to
205 INST. OF LATIN AM. STUDIES, RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNA-





209 Id. at 19.
210 John K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PENN. J. INT’L. ECON. L.
219, 233-34 (2007) (citing Alex Inkeles, Making Men Modern: On the Causes and
Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, 71 AM. J. SOC.
208, 210 (1969)).
211 INST. OF LATIN AM. STUDIES, supra note 205, at 20.
212 Id. at 20-21.
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Washington-based consulting agencies in reliance on advisors from
Latin America.213  The projects avoided legal education and law draft-
ing, but attempted to view reform of the justice sector as a systematic
enterprise requiring inclusion of all actors within the system.214
Again, these programs were later regarded as ineffective, especially
given the large amount of funds expended as compared to the minimal
changes that were effected.
B. The Third Round: Rule of Law Reform Initiatives
In the 1990s, a third round of now globalized reform initiatives
began with the collapse of Communism in Europe and focused on the
rule of law.  Right-leaning, conservative pundits initially posited that
the rule of law was needed to encourage investment and hence eco-
nomic development; more recently left-leaning pundits have posited
that the rule of law is necessary to stop or prevent human rights
abuses before economic development can begin.  Whatever the political
justification, the focus has been on the development of “independent”
judicial systems.
This newest “rule of law” approach purportedly focuses on “gov-
ernance” rather than simply improving governments – it emphasizes
participation of both the public and private sector in adhering to estab-
lished laws, privatization of government assets, peaceful transition
from authoritarian rule, a system of democratically-elected govern-
ments setting forth clear, publicly known laws applicable to everyone,
and it attempts to downplay ethnocentricity.  As discussed at the be-
ginning of this article, this round of reform uses the term rule of law in
the sense of Rechsstaat to mean effective government.
This approach has been supported not just by U.S. AID, but
also by entities such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organiza-
tion, and the International Monetary Fund.  It acknowledges cultural
differences to the extent that it posits that “the main obstacle to
achievement of the rule of law, . . . is the lack of political will of local
leaders to subject themselves to the scrutiny of an independent court
system.”215 A multiplicity of international agencies addressed them-
selves to advising Latin American and other developing countries on
how to develop an “independent” court system. Though the jury is still
out on a number of countries, this third round of reform initiatives is
already facing criticism similar to that of the first two rounds as being
largely an enormous waste of time and money.216
213 Id.
214 Id. at 21-22.
215 Id. at 25.
216 WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN
AMERICA:  DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW (Praeger Publishers 2000).
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C. Problematic Judicial Systems
U.S. AID describes rule-of-law problems with Latin American
judicial systems thusly:
Societies can be greatly weakened by judicial systems in
which certain citizens are above the law, while others are
victimized by unfair processes or inadequate access to
justice.  Without much-needed judicial reforms, many of
the region’s courts would continue to operate under anti-
quated laws adopted from former colonial regimes.
Under corrupt or inefficient justice systems, the poor and
other disenfranchised are granted less access to justice,
court proceedings are long and unproductive, and delays
can disable the court system. Defendants may spend
years in jail before even going to trial, while gross offend-
ers of human rights too often escape punishment.217
The crime and corruption that result from an ineffective  crimi-
nal justice system can be costly.218  According to a corruption and
crime study by Center for Strategic and International Studies, a cor-
rupt justice system can “slow economic development, undermine the
strength and credibility of democratic institutions, and erode the social
capital necessary for development.”219  World Bank economists esti-
mate that Latin America’s average per capita income would be 25%
higher if it had a crime rate comparable to that of rest of the world.220
Consequently, although there is certainly room for improvement in
North American criminal justice systems, Central and South Ameri-
can systems face more international criticism.
8. THE CULTURAL DIVIDE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA
“The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics,
that determines the success of a society.  The central liberal truth is that
politics can change a culture and save it from itself.”221
As the first two bands of reform efforts demonstrated, one can-
not simply change either an entire legal system or portions of it with-
out addressing the underlying cultural ethic – whether one refers to
the micro-culture of the legal system itself, or the culture and expecta-
217 USAID PROMOTES THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN DEMOC-





221 Samuel P. Huntington, Foreword: Cultures Count, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra
note 15, at xiii, xiv (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
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tions of the local society.  The reasons cited for failure of the first band
of reform efforts included lack of respect and understanding on the
part of reformers for civilian legal systems, and the resulting ineffec-
tiveness of the legal transplants they tried to incorporate from other
(often U.S.) jurisdictions.  Borrowing ideas from other legal systems
can be effective, but those ideas have to be tailored to the local system,
adapted to it, and adopted by it: they cannot be simply incorporated
wholesale.  The most extreme example of legal transplantation was
Turkey’s 1926 adoption of the entire Swiss Civil Code into Turkey,
which originally caused a number of problems, including the instant
legal dissolution of a number of Islamic marriages and the resulting
delegitimizing of the children of those marriages.222
The second band of reform efforts in Latin America, like the
first, failed because, in trying to incorporate lessons learned from the
first round, it attempted to change only small portions of an existing
legal system without taking into account existing political and cultural
entities.  Professors comfortable with training future lawyers in an ex-
isting system were not comfortable with learning another, as-yet-non-
existent system; judges did not want to give up prosecutorial power
they had for decades, nor did they want to lose political capital and
protection they had accrued over time.  Furthermore, they had no ex-
perience and no reason to believe that the new systems would actually
work.  Once you have become a vested professional, changing the rules
of the game and learning an entirely new way of doing things is not
something that most people will welcome.  And these are only the su-
perficial differences – underlying cultural differences make the whole
enterprise even more difficult.
A. Latin-American Culture
In contrast with the focus on individualism, independence, lib-
erty of trade and rule of law, the Spanish belief systems traditionally
supported personalized exchange, kinship ties, and status systems.
Furthermore, the Bourbon centralized government decision-making
did not “provide incentives for anonymous exchange,” and this system
222 See Arzu Oguz, The Role of Comparative Law in the Development of Turkish
Civil Law, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 373, 381-85 (2005)(discussing some of the
problems that came with the shift to the Swiss Civil Code).  These problems were
apparently dealt with by allowing a loose translation.  Ruth A. Miller, The Otto-
man and Islamic Substratum of Turkey’s Swiss Civil Code, 11 J. ISLAMIC STUD.
335, 335-361 (2000) (stating that the subsequent loose translation allowed for a
better fit between the code and the society to which it was applied).  The most
serious, immediate problem caused by the wholesale adoption was most likely that
it instantaneously delegitimized large numbers of children who had been regarded
as legitimate under the pre-existing Islamic system. ZWIEGERT & KO¨TZ, supra
note 40, at 184-85.
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was reproduced in Latin America with even “more perverse results”
than in the original European countries.223  Catholicism, similarly,
has preserved an absolutist, centralized approach based on traditional
hierarchical structure.
While not accompanied by genocide in the recent past, Latin
America’s failures (including bloody civil wars and coup d’etats) simi-
larly have been attributed to a statist, feudalistic culture valuing loy-
alty to a small group rather than honesty in governmental offices.
[I]n . . . much of Latin America, social capital resides
largely in large families and a rather narrow circle of
personal friends.  Not only do people distrust those
outside their circle of trust, but they feel that a lower
standard of moral behavior applies outside their kinship
group.  This, in turn, generates destructive norms that
tolerate corruption.  In such societies, public and corpo-
rate officials are not concerned with their reputations
outside their immediate group, and group members put
in positions of trust feel “entitled to steal” on behalf of
their families.224
Frequently, “savage capitalism” is blamed for the poverty of
the half of all Latin Americans who “survive in shacks with dirt floors
and tin roofs.”225  Instead of being in the hands of entrepreneurs com-
mitted to risk and innovation, a large part of the capital in Latin
America is controlled by cautious speculators who prefer to invest
their money in real estate.  These are not modern capitalists, but
rather landowners in the feudal tradition.226  Even more to blame is
the “mercantilist businessman who seeks his fortune through political
influence rather than market competition . . . [and] shares his profits
with corrupt politicians in a vicious circle that produces both increas-
ing profits and increasing corruption.”227
Consequently, part of the problem in Latin America that has
led to both corruption and the lack of the rule of law (meaning lack of
respect on the part of both citizenry and government) is a feudalistic
culture that regards a government position as a fiefdom and an offi-
cial’s first duty as being to award friends and family.  Bureaucracies
grew under both military and socialist governments.  The “desire
223 E´rica Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform:  A Case Study of Brazil, 27
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 803, 868-69 (2006).
224 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 41 (2008) (citations omitted).
225 Carlos Alberto Montaner, Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America,
in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 15, at 56, 60.
226 Id.
227 Id.
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\RGL102.txt unknown Seq: 39  2-DEC-10 15:08
2010] THE RULE OF LAW 95
among the elites to develop and transform [Latin America,] which they
believed to be backward, led to the adoption of constitutions and laws
that provided significant power to the central state.  The cure for un-
derdevelopment was oligarchy and dictatorship today, a more inclu-
sive republican government tomorrow.”228  The constitutions were not
a failed attempt to establish republican government, but a successful
attempt to preserve traditional Romano-Hispanic absolutism using
liberal forms.229  Although liberal forms were used, there was no at-
tempt to establish checks and balances because of distrust due to lack
of experience in how they work, and the fear that they would detract
from the power of the central state.
B. Anglo-American Protestant Culture
In contrast to the Latin American hierarchical culture, one
characteristic that contributes to the rule of law in the United States is
the Protestant ethic that still undergirds society.  As the Federalists
indicated, a principled, virtuous polity is necessary for good govern-
ment.  The Anglo-Protestant culture values individuality and personal
responsibility.  It also focuses on covenant – whether that means a
Covenant between God and Man, the marriage covenant, the consent
theory of government, or the basic understanding that one should keep
one’s word and perform what one promised to do.  Furthermore, the
Anglo-American culture is still very concerned that judicial decisions
should be grounded in law established by practice (not theory), and
thus judges should be held accountable for their decisions such that
future decisions will be consistent with them. For example, Justice
Scalia wrote that a judge should stick “close to the facts, not relying
upon overarching generalizations, and thereby leaving considerable
room for future judges . . . .  [This concern] is thought to be the genius
of the common law system.”230
Similarly, the faith in covenant is balanced by a practical un-
derstanding of the corruptible nature of man and government officials
in particular.231  The average American still regards government as a
necessary evil.  Furthermore, Americans are a litigious society.  This
means that they generally are not willing to accept an act by another
that they feel unjustifiably infringes on their liberty or welfare.  The
228 Schor, supra note 173, at 17.
229 Glen Dealy, Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition, 48
HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 37, 51-52, 58 (1968).
230 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1177 (1989).
231 See e.g., SIR JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG-ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND
POWER 364 (Beacon Press 1949) (“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely.”).
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\RGL102.txt unknown Seq: 40  2-DEC-10 15:08
96 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:1
American judicial system may be effective in part because citizens use
it so often and can be counted upon to object vociferously and publi-
cally when they feel they have been treated unfairly, whether by an
fellow citizen or by the system.
C. The Protestant Ethic, Colonialism, and Values
As discussed previously, Western Protestant countries remain
at the top of indices for economic development, absence of corruption,
and the rule of law. The Protestant ethic, as studied by Max Weber,
values “hard work, honesty, seriousness, and the thrifty use of money
and time,” which promote business and capital accumulation.232 Two
additional values may help account for the prominence of the Protes-
tant culture:  the emphasis on literacy and the importance given to
time.233 The emphasis on education and literacy for both girls and
boys, was a result of Bible-reading and led to higher literacy from gen-
eration to generation.234  The making and buying of clocks and
watches (most clock-makers were Protestants), and the use of them to
measure time was stressed far more in Britain and Holland than in
Catholic countries.235  Parental styles reflect still other values, includ-
ing individualism, autonomy, self-reliance, and self-expression.  The
statistical result has been that countries with a greater percentage of
Protestants and a British colonial history are associated with low
levels of national corruption and a strong GDP.236
The lack of the rule of law and poor economic development in
struggling countries are habitually blamed on colonialism by both
Protestant and Catholic European countries.  However, as one African
scholar posits: “[W]e can no longer reasonably blame the colonial pow-
ers for our condition.  Several decades have passed during which we
have been in substantial control of our own destiny. Yet today Africa is
more dependent than ever on rich countries. . . .”237
Authoritarianism permeates Africa’s families, villages, schools,
and churches. Traditional African education prepares children for in-
tegration into their tribal community, but offers few incentives for chil-
232 David Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS,
supra note 15, at 10, 11.
233 Id. at 12.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Seymour Martin Lipset & Gabriel Salman Menz, Corruption, Culture, and
Markets, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 15, at 112, 116; see also Mariano
Grondona, A Cultural Typology of Economic Development, in CULTURE MATTERS,
supra note 15, at 44, 47-53.
237 Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 15, at 66.
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dren to surpass their parents’ success.238  A static view of life
permeates the culture.  Changes in social standing are not accepted,
and those who are dominant hold the power.239  Thus, coup d’etat is
the only path to power for those born subservient.240 Indeed, the com-
munity accepts, naturally, “the servitude imposed by the strong man
of the moment.”241  In Africa, this feudalistic view of life has led to
genocide, civil war, and rampant crime.242  Latin America has not ex-
perienced genocide recently, or not to the same extent, but many of the
problems faced by governmental reform efforts stem from a similar
feudalistic view of society.
D. Cultural Reasons Why Reform Efforts Fail
While multinational and U.S. agencies have expended much ef-
fort and money to strengthen the rule of law through changing govern-
ance in developing countries, as a general rule (to which there are
exceptions), those problems have proven to be intractable.  Most often,
the changes fail to make a long-term difference because the underlying
culture has not changed its feudalistic values.  In the United States,
anthropologists and sociologists have ignored the  cultural explana-
tions for the difficulties faced by Afro-Americans.243  This may be be-
cause reactionary right-wing public figures previously attributed
social problems to “values,” thereby enabling them to free themselves
of any responsibility for ameliorating the problems, and because of the
liberal mantra that “cultural explanations amount to blaming the vic-
tim.”244  In the humanities and liberal circles, culture is a “symbolic
system to be interpreted, understood, discussed, delineated, respected,
and celebrated as the distinctive product of a particular group of peo-
ple, of equal worth with all other such products.”245  However, those in
these circles believe that culture “should never be used to explain any-
thing about the people who produced it.”246  The tragedy of this view is
that it is both unrealistic and fatalistic: any study of history will reveal
the extent to which cultures evolve over time as a result of contact
with other cultures, internal criticism, and other factors.247
238 Id. at 76.
239 Id. at 70.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 74.
243 Orlando Patterson, Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and an Afro-
American Illustration, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 15, at 202, 204.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 202.
246 Id.
247 See also Nicholas Capaldi, Philosophical Amnesia, in CONCEPTIONS OF PHILOS-
OPHY, 93, 102-03  & n.32 (Anthony O’Hear ed., 2009)
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Cultural relativists insist on respect for the values of other
groups, and while some of this respect may be well deserved, a blanket
of it can smother the kind of careful and objective self-criticism that
can lead to change. Attorneys avoid any mention of culture because of
the same simplistic politicization of the problem and because of the
current relativistic view that law should avoid the imposition of moral
values on a society.  This view was inherited from the positivist views
developed by Jeremy Bentham, adopted by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
and since spread through law schools both in the United States and
abroad.248  Furthermore, because these views are widespread through-
out the developed world, it is taboo for those international entities that
advise developing countries about how to change their governments to
discuss cultural values and cultural change, and it would also be
overtly patronizing.  These same views may account for the fact that
little study has been made of how a culture can effect a goal-directed
change in values and acceptable behavior without adopting the kinds
of propaganda used by the Nazi regime or Lenin’s use of agitatsiya
propaganda (agitprop) to win the support of intellectuals and workers
for the Communist Revolution.
9. ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL SYSTEMS IN LATIN
AMERICA
Judicial reform efforts in Latin America typically try to transi-
tion toward a more adversarial and oral style and away from the often
laborious and paper-based trial procedures inherited from colonial Ci-
vilian regimes.  Instead of panels of judges working to investigate
every detail of a case and presenting all arguments through paper-
based trials which could often take years, reformers have sought that
courts in Latin America and the Caribbean begin to hear oral argu-
ments from attorneys on both sides, with the judges acting
impartially.
Sensitive to the cultural difficulties prior reform efforts faced,
as well as the problems created by legal transplants, international or-
ganizations have nevertheless invested large sums of money in rule of
[The] [s]ocial world is the interaction of self-directed individuals.
Social knowledge and understanding do not consist of the discov-
ery of absolute (timeless and contextless) standards external to
humanity but involve, instead, the clarification of standards im-
plicit within the human mind and/or social practice. . . .  No cul-
ture dictates its own future.  Human beings are always free to
accept, reject, or redeploy their inheritance.
Id.
248 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt
Against Natural Law, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 491 (2008-09).
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law efforts to develop independent judiciaries in the expectation that it
will improve local economy and protect human rights.
10. THE LOW AND THE HIGH OF RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL REFORM
IN LATIN AMERICA
There is a tendency to think of Latin America as split between
leftist and rightist governments, but commentators now argue this is
not a good way to understand the current state of affairs of Latin
America.249  With the exception of the Cuban government, most gov-
ernments are democratically elected in relatively free and honest elec-
tions.250  The major difference, however, is whether or not Latin -
American democratically-elected presidents act democratically or
whether they behave “like authoritarians who use the democratic
rules of the game to destroy democracy.”251  Under this analysis, Presi-
dents Luiz Ina`cio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Tabare´ Va`zquez of Uru-
guay (left-of-center), along with Presidents Alvaro Uribe of Colombia,
Felipe Caldero´n of Mexico, and Sebastian Pin˜era of Chile (right of
center) may differ on policy priorities, but they all behave democrati-
cally in implementing their policies.252  In contrast, elected
authoritarians, such as Presidents Hugo Cha`vez of Venezuela, Evo
Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, try to “centralize
both political and economic power in their own hands, to the detriment
of their countries’ democratic institutions.”253  The behavior of these
elected authoritarians therefore also weaken the rule of law.254
A. Venezuela
When he took office in December 1998, President Cha`vez im-
mediately rewrote the constitution so as to weaken the other two gov-
ernmental branches and the two-party system.255  The new
constitution expanded presidential powers, lengthened the presidency
to six years, and weakened the bicameral National Assembly by
changing it to a unicameral legislature.256  Though the 2000 constitu-
tion added a two-term limit to the presidency, a 2007 revision (passed
249 PURCELL, supra note 203, at 1-2.





255 Larry Rohter, In Latin America, the Strongman Stirs in His Grave, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at D4.
256 Mario J. Garcia-Serra, Comment, The “Enabling Law”: The Demise of the Sep-
aration of Powers in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265,
276 (2001).
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by the now-unicameral National Assembly) eliminated presidential
term limits, gave the presidency expropriation powers, and limited
central bank autonomy.257  Though these changes were defeated by
referendum, a subsequent referendum on February 15, 2009 allowed
Cha`vez to eliminate presidential term limits and thus run for re-elec-
tion indefinitely.258
In addition, he has ended the autonomy of the Venezuelan Su-
preme Court and gone so far as to arrest judges with whom he disap-
proves.259 He has closed media outlets which are critical of him,260 and
he also has subjected a number of journalists who criticized his actions
to imprisonment.261  Despite the fact that middle- and upper-class
Venezuelans despise him for nationalizing some of their lands and in-
dustries and have made numerous attempts to oust him, he remains
popular with the poor people of Venezuela because of his charisma and
his socialist programs including clinics, social programs, and construc-
tion projects.
257 See Harout Jack Samra, Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America: A Survey
and Case Studies, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 64 (2010).
258 Simon Romero, Cha`vez Decisively Wins Bid to End Term Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2009, at A1.
259 Simon Romero, Cha`vez Quells Challenges with Arrests of His Critics, N.Y.
Times, April 3, 2010, at A6.
260 Simon Romero, Cha`vez Looks at His Critics in the Media and Sees the Enemy,
N.Y. Times, June 1, 2007, at A6.
261 Rogelio Perez Perdomo, Una evaluacion de la reforma judicial en Venezuela
(2006), available at http://www.cejamericas.org/portal/index.php/es/biblioteca/
biblioteca-virtual/doc_details/1895-una-evaluacion-de-la-reforma-judicial-en-vene
zuela. (“El estrecho control politico sobre los jueces es necesario porque la repres-
sion polı´tica se hace vı´a systema judicial.  En el momento en que se escribı´a este
trabajo, cinco periodistas conocidos estaban en prisio´n, en fuga o sometidos a
proceso penal. Dos alcaldes do oposicio´n de Caracas estaban sometidos a juicio y se
iniciaron averiguaciones contra el Gobernador del EstadoZulia.  El General Uso´n
fue condenado a seis an˜os de prisio´n por explicar en television el funcionamiento
de un lanzallamas y sen˜alar que las graves quemaduras que causaron la muerte o
graves lesions a soldados sometidos a castigo en celda disciplinarian han podido
ser causadas con ese instrument.” (“It’s necessary to maintain close control over
the judicial system in order to maintain political repression.  At the time of this
writing, five well-known journalists are in prison, in flight, or under prosecution.
Two opposition leaders from Caracos were under scrutiny, and inquiries against
the Governor of Zulia state are underway.  General Uso´n has been condemned to
six years of prison for explaining on television how a flam-thrower operates and
indicating that the burns that caused death and serious injury to a number of
soldiers in military prison could have been caused by such a flame-thrower.” (trans
author)).
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In the mid-1990s, the World Bank supplied considerable funds
($35 million)262 and consultative expertise to reform Venezuelan
courts.  Before reform, the judicial system was “marked by inefficiency,
widespread corruption, very low levels of resources, and the heavy in-
fluence of the country’s two leading political parties.”263  Efforts were
made to improve the quality and efficiency of the judicial system.
These included the institution of a system of justices of the peace to
reach out to underserved communities, as well as a new penal code in
1998, which established an adversarial system with district attorneys,
oral procedures, open trials, and plea bargaining.264However, Presi-
dent Cha`vez’s 1999 constitution abolished the Judicial Council (Con-
sejo de la Judicatura) that had “governed the recruitment, training,
and discipline of judges, as well as the Supreme Court itself, replacing
them with a Supreme Tribunal of Justice that combined both func-
tions.”265  He then packed that body with 32 members named by a sim-
ple majority vote of the National Assembly, which is predominantly
Cha`vez loyalists.266  The most significant recent change in the judicial
system is its submission to Cha`vez’s political interest.  The Supreme
Tribunal has conducted several purges of lower court judges whose de-
cisions were counter to Chavez’s positions.267  Consequently, the
courts remain both corrupt and lacking in independence, and so cor-
ruption continues to be widespread.268
While the World Bank’s reforms led to some successes in terms
of better infrastructure, technology advancements, and efficiency in
resolving cases in areas such as labor law, its criminal prosecution re-
cord, especially in the face of increasing homicides, kidnappings, and
robbery, has been poor.269 Additionally, only the decisions of the Su-
preme Tribunal are publicized, so there is little data with which to
analyze the system.270  Consequently, “many of the negative aspects of
Venezuela’s traditionally corrupt and ineffective judicial system have
persisted.”271  The judiciary is even more politicized and subordinate
262 Id.
263 PETER DESHAZO & JUAN ENRIQUE VARGAS, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA: AN ASSESSMENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES







269 Id. See also Simon Romero, Venezuela, More Deadly Than Iraq, Wonders Why,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at A1.
270 DESHAZO & VARGAS, supra note 263, at 10.
271 Id.
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to the executive branch than previously.  By 2004, the World Bank
stated that its attempt to reform the Venezuelan judicial system had
concluded.272  Consequently, Cha`vez has significantly undermined
whatever rule of law existed in Venezuela’s judicial system prior to his
coming to power, as well as undermined whatever improvements
might have been made by the World Bank’s investments.
B. Chile
The reforms Chile has made to its criminal justice system are
in marked contrast to Venzuela’s deterioration.  Moreover, those re-
forms have been self-funded – Chile has invested in excess of $500 mil-
lion.273  Prior to 1997, under the inquisitorial system Chile inherited
and adapted from colonial Spain, a Chilean criminal trial had no pros-
ecutor and a single judge was responsible for the entire proceeding,
leaving little possibility for defense counsel to intervene.274  In the
first part of the trial, a secret pre-trial phase, the judge directed the
investigation, determined if a crime had been committed, and charged
the defendant with the particular crime or crimes.275 In the second
part of the procedure, the public trial, the judge disclosed all of the
evidence, found the defendant guilty or innocent, and sentenced the
defendant.276 The entire procedure was written, giving defendant
counsel little or no role in the procedure, but the primary problem was
the concentration in one person of the power to investigate, accuse,
and decide.277
By the 1990s, there were a number of perceived problems with
this system, including (among others) biased judges, ineffective inves-
tigation, substantial judicial delay, lack of transparency and lack of
protection for defendants who had no access to their own files, lack of
delegation of functions between the police and court clerks, lack of con-
trol over the police,278 and, of course, the problem of the concentration
of power.  Because of a public and political consensus that Chile’s crim-
inal legal system was ineffective at both deterring criminal activity
and protecting human rights (i.e. it was ineffective at both Hayekian
rule of law components), in 1997 Chile’s Congress enacted a constitu-
272 Id. at 9.
273 James M. Cooper, Proyecto Acceso: Using Popular Culture to Build the Rule of
Law in Latin America, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 378, 383-84 (2008)
274 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:  The
Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 323, 325 (1998).
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 E-mail from Alejandro Silva, Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law,
Universidad de los Andes, to Nadia E. Nedzel (Jan. 2010) (on file with author).
278 De la Barra Cousino, supra note 274, at 325.
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tional amendment intended to make widespread and substantial
changes to the criminal justice system.279
Chile adopted an adversarial procedure, creating a public pros-
ecutor’s office charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes, a
public defender’s office with discovery power,280 and it changed the
role of the judge to that of an umpire and arbitrator.281 Trials under
the new system are more oral in character and encourage free and
open debate and clear and logical presentations from each attorney.282
Congress’s act created two types of judges: Guarantee Judges (Jueces
de Garantia), whose role is to guarantee due process by reviewing the
evidence brought by the prosecution.283  They are also empowered to
take guilty pleas and preside over trials.284  If the pre-trial procedures
overseen by the Guarantee Judge do not result in a resolution, then a
three-judge panel (Tribunal Oral en lo Penal) resolves remaining cases
by overseeing more extensive oral trials.285  All parties have access to
the files, and trials are open to the public and recorded on CD.286
Thus, the institutional changes were designed to incorporate built-in
checks and balances as well as transparency in an effort to deter cor-
ruption, increase efficiency, promote equal application of the law and
fairness, and strengthen independence.  The institutional changes
were meant to strengthen the rule of law in the common law sense of
buttressing limits on government and reducing the effects of
politicization.
The real genius of the Chilean reformation to its criminal jus-
tice system, however, lies in the thoughtful way in which it was imple-
mented.  To ensure that the changes would have lasting effect, the
legal culture needed to be changed, as did Chilean society’s expecta-
tions of the criminal legal system.  Furthermore, Chilean policy mak-
ers recognized the problems of legal transplants, so the changes
needed to work with the existing civilian system and needed to be
carefully incorporated into the legal system.  Consequently, for the
first several years, Spanish-speaking U.S. instructors educated those
who would later train and direct the institutions involved.  In recruit-
ing personnel, the focus was on finding young, ambitious people who
279 See id. at 327.
280 Id. at 328, 356.
281 Rafael Blanco et al., Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evalua-
tion and Challenges; 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 253, 255-259 (2005).
282 Id. at 256.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Comment on draft of article by Luis Alejandro Silva Irarra´zaval, Profesor y
Director de Estudios de la Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de los Andes, Santi-
ago, Chile (Mar. 22, 2010) (on file with author).
286 Id. at 262.
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were not already ingrained in existing systems and practice.  Chileans
trained  defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and court clerks “to
avoid the charges of judicial imperialism.”287 Prosecutors, defense at-
torneys, and judges then gained preliminary experience through simu-
lated trials so that they could adjust to their new roles.288
After the training was completed, rather than trying to incor-
porate all of these changes throughout the entire country simultane-
ously (a method that has proven to be unsuccessful since the first band
of “legal reform” efforts), Chile began the process with pilot programs
in two regions in order to test the new process in a controlled environ-
ment and address problems as they arose.289  In keeping with the in-
cremental approach, the new system applied only prospectively to new
cases, not cases that had already been filed under the old system.290
Efforts were also made to sensitize and educate the citizenry, using a
highly inclusive and participatory process including the creation of a
study center linked to the coalition of political parties that crafted the
reform.
Furthermore, knowing that training the legal sector in the new
model of criminal procedure was necessary but not sufficient in sus-
taining reform efforts, Chile recognized that the general public needed
to know about the reform and needed to support it and the tremendous
expenditure of public resources.291  Polls in 2002 and 2003 showed
that few Chileans were aware of the  reform of Chilean criminal proce-
dure.292  Over sixty-eight percent of those surveyed believed that the
government cared little about justice.293  The government needed to
explain principles such as the presumption of innocence, how to get
representation by a new Public Defender, and it needed to impart con-
fidence in the general public about the transformation.  Consequently,
the Chilean government’s publicity campaign included a film on com-
parative justice and an animated series, Superheroes Legales, about
lawyers who “transform into superheroes defending the innocent, pro-
viding access to justice, and building the rule of law.”294
The changes to Chile’s criminal justice system have apparently
brought significant improvement to transparency, speed, due process,
impartiality, and professionalism.295 All phases of trials are open to
287 Cooper, supra note 273, at 383.
288 Blanco et al., supra note 281, at 259.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 260.
291 Cooper, supra note 273, at 383-84.
292 Id. at 384.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 398-401.
295 Blanco et al., supra note 281, at 263.
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the public.296  The average duration of prosecutions under the inquisi-
tional system was 3.5 years, but ranges from 1.3 to 10.4 months under
the new system.297  Previously, there was no direct contact between
the judge and the victim.  Under the new system, the same judge often
hears the entire case from beginning to end, eliminating the corrupt
actuaries and bailiffs who previously acted as intermediaries between
the parties and the judge.298  By providing a judge who has no part in
the prosecution, oral trial, immediate access, and a speedy trial, the
new system helps protect the defendant’s due process rights including
the presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy trial, the right to a
quality defense, the right to confront witnesses and evidence, and the
right to an impartial and honest judge.299
The new system further provides support to victims in the form
of public ministry officials who accompany victims and witnesses to
court, provide psychological support, and provide protection from retri-
bution through panic buttons, cell phones, police protection, and wit-
ness protection programs.300  Finally, the retooling of Chile’s criminal
justice program in the pilot programs has led to a higher level of pro-
fessionalism among police and forensic scientists301— though more
may be needed to further improve the police force.302  Nevertheless, it
is now regarded as one of the least corrupt criminal justice systems in
Latin America.303  Thus, the Chilean criminal justice system has be-
come more effective at both punishing criminals and protecting the
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 263-64.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. Accord Fensom, supra note 203, at 97. See also VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
DEVELOPING INDICATORS TO MEASURE THE RULE OF LAW: A GLOBAL APPROACH (July
2008), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=1807/Developing%2BIndica
tors%2Bto%2BMeasure%2Bthe%2BRule%2Bof%2BLaw%2B%2528Online%2Bver
sion%25292.pdf (indicating that the public is aware that the law now guarantees
defense in criminal matters, that the government does not use arrests to suppress
rival political groups, that most of the population does not believe they could bribe
their way out of a ticket, and that police are promoted on the basis of merit); Lydia
Brashear Tiede, unpublished whitepaper, Chile’s Experiment in Criminal Law Re-
form:  Conversion from an Inquisitorial to Adversarial System 2001-2005,
presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Hilton
Chicago (April 03, 2008), available at allacademic.com/meta/p266078_index.html.
(agreeing that reforms have been efficacious, but posits that police reform is
needed to get full benefit of the changes).
302 Tiede supra note 301, at 22.
303 JORGE CORREA SUTIL, SEMINARIO EN LATINOAME´RICA DE TEORI´A CONSTITU-
CIONAL Y POLITI´CA: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA,
ANY HOPE OF EQUALITY? 7 (1999).
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rights of those accused (i.e., it has strengthened the rule through law).
However, it has also improved the rule of law in that it has imple-
mented a system with greater transparency and governmental ac-
countability: public, oral proceedings and two systems of judges
provide transparency and accountability, and adversarial agencies
(prosecutors and public defenders) add an additional check on govern-
mental powers.304  While U.S. advisors were used, and the new system
borrows ideas from the U.S., the system adopted is uniquely adapted
to Chile by Chilen˜os.305
The changes to Chile’s criminal judicial system have not yet
fully been processed, and given preexisting legal culture, there is al-
ways a possibility that the system could return to something more
closely approximating its pre-reformation state.306  One commentator
has indicated that although the reforms to the criminal justice system
may be helpful, there is no provision to prevent another military take-
over.307  Given the existing stability of the Chilean government and
electoral process, however, this is highly unlikely to occur.308  Never-
theless, the preliminary results of the holistic changes made to Chile’s
criminal justice system have been promising.309
Chilean concerns included a worry that the new due process
rights granted to the accused would make it too difficult to prosecute
criminals effectively, but the improvement in trial speed and efficiency
has apparently overridden that concern.310 Chile has worked hard to
change its entire criminal justice system in a manner similar to the
U.S. adversarial model, while still maintaining civilian elements (such
as a 3-judge panel for trials of first instance) and it is doing so with
apparent success because the change was carefully thought-through,
was implemented incrementally, was made by a political coalition of
both sides motivated to make changes,311 and because attention was
given to how to best approach changing both the underlying profes-
sional culture and the public perception of what to expect from a crimi-
nal justice system.  Since the successful implementation of the
revisions to the criminal justice system, similar changes have been
made to judicial proceedings in labor and family law.  The change to








311 See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW RE-
FORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 157 (2008)
(discussing Chile’s successful judicial reform).
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there have been some problems with regard to family law proceedings.
As of this writing, efforts are being made to reform civil procedure
along the same lines.312
Despite the quasi-fatalistic, overly respectful views of cultural
heritage shared by intellectuals, policy-makers, and pundits; non-pro-
ductive cultural habits and views can be changed, but it takes a combi-
nation of both legal and popular insistence, as illustrated by the
process of U.S. segregation in the 1960s.313  There are certain legal
prerequisites that must be addressed (an independent judiciary with
an adversarial component, functioning governmental agencies), but
there is little point in changing the legal infrastructure without also
addressing cultural issues – something attorneys and pundits all too
often regard as a taboo subject.314
There are, however, success stories.  Chile is one, and the U.S.
in some ways is itself another.  Although slavery was abolished in the
U.S. in 1865, the feudalistic culture of slavery clearly was not.315  That
culture remains a causal factor of Afro-American problems in the U.S.
However, significant progress has been made since the Civil Rights
movement of the 1960s.  There is now a significant African-American
middle class represented in all sectors and professions, though not yet
in numbers large enough to indicate that all vestiges of the culture of
slavery have disappeared.  The President of the United States is him-
self African-American.  The change began when Congress passed legis-
lation barring segregation — legislation enforced by the federal
government in the face of violence.316  The U.S. Supreme Court had
similarly declared segregated public schools to be unconstitutional,
but no significant changes were actually made until after the Congres-
sional legislation was passed.317  In this instance, all three branches of
the U.S. federal government acted as a check against feudalistic state
governments, (though before and since there have been instances
where the state governments acted as a check against an over-power-
ful U.S. federal government).  Thus, there were significant legal
changes, but they would have meant nothing without widespread
changes in the public’s attitude.  While anti-black racism was accepted
312 Alejandro Silva, supra n. 277.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Patterson, supra note 243, at 213.
316 See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:  Can Courts Bring About
Social Change (1991) (arguing that it was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
brought about social change in the U.S., not just the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
317 See, e.g., Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting Brown v.
Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal and Political Perspective, 47
HOW. L.J. 627 (2004).
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among certain sectors of white America before the Civil Rights move-
ment, residual racists are now generally treated by U.S. culture with
the contempt they so richly deserve.  In the United States and Chile,
changes in the legal system and a resultant strengthening of the rule
of law were initiated by a legal and political consensus and then fur-
thered along by a change in cultural expectations.
Tragically, Venezuela, because of its authoritarian/feudalistic
leadership, remains trapped in the past, without the rule of law.  In
contrast, Chile has developed into a stabile, productive economy, and
other developing countries can do the same.  The focus must be on
making changes that will ensure procedural fairness as well as adopt-
ing positive cultural values.  Above all, however, the ultimate focus
must be on building institutions that will limit government and force it
to police itself.
11. CONCLUSION
The rule of law means more than equal application of the laws
and maintaining order.  It is a requirement that there be institutional
checks and balances built into government to prevent tyranny and
counteract politicization.  Even Plato knew that democracies are un-
stable and prone to a “race to the bottom.”318  In addition to the stabil-
ity provided by a republican structure of government, some
mechanisms such as separation of powers (Montesquieu/U.S version),
a bicameral legislative body, and judicial independence help, but there
must be other mechanisms as well to encourage transparency and pub-
lic accountability.  The checks and balances utilized in the U.S. and
the United Kingdom go beyond those listed in the U.S. Constitution or
the judicial review power developed initially by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison to include the jury system, other ele-
ments of the unwritten British constitution, and the principle of stare
decisis itself.  The mere implementation of such mechanisms, however,
is not enough if not embraced by both the legal culture and the overall
society of a developing country.
It is the common law definition of the rule of law, in the sense
that the law is above the government, coupled with shared cultural
values, that has led to the continuing stability and economic prosper-
ity experienced by countries such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, and
the United Kingdom itself.  The underlying bulwark of the Anglo-
American rule of law is that the law is pre-eminent and government is
a civil association that follows strict, transparent procedures to pre-
vent favoritism and instrumentalism.  Furthermore, the structure of
government itself must take into account the fallibility of human be-
318 E.g., Arthur J. Jacobson, Origins of the Game Theory of Law and the Limits of
Harmony in Plato’s Laws, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1335 (1999).
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ings as political animals and harness it in such a way that governmen-
tal powers are necessarily constrained.  For both developed and
developing countries, the advantages of the rule of law can only be re-
alized through changes in procedural, structural, political, and cul-
tural characteristics, rather than through mere substantive changes in
the law.
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